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Abstract
We introduce new models and new information theoretic measures for the study of communication
complexity in the natural peer-to-peer, multi-party, number-in-hand setting. We prove a number of prop-
erties of our new models and measures, and then, in order to exemplify their effectiveness, we use them
to prove two lower bounds. The more elaborate one is a tight lower bound of Ω(kn) on the multi-party
peer-to-peer randomized communication complexity of the k-player, n-bit function Disjointness, Disjnk .
The other one is a tight lower bound of Ω(kn) on the multi-party peer-to-peer randomized communi-
cation complexity of the k-player, n-bit bitwise parity function, Parnk . Both lower bounds hold when
n = Ω(k). The lower bound forDisjn
k
improves over the lower bound that can be inferred from the result
of Braverman et al. (FOCS 2013), which was proved in the coordinator model and can yield a lower
bound of Ω(kn/ log k) in the peer-to-peer model.
To the best of our knowledge, our lower bounds are the first tight (non-trivial) lower bounds on
communication complexity in the natural peer-to-peermulti-party setting.
In addition to the above results for communication complexity, we also prove, using the same tools,
an Ω(n) lower bound on the number of random bits necessary for the (information theoretic) private
computation of the function Disjnk .
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1 Introduction
Communication complexity, first introduced by Yao [48], has become a major topic of research in Theoreti-
cal Computer Science, both for its own sake, and as a tool which has yielded important results (mostly lower
bounds) in various theoretical computer science fields such as circuit complexity, streaming algorithms, or
data structures (e.g., [37, 40, 25, 43, 24]). Communication complexity is a measure for the amount of
communication needed in order to solve a problem whose input is distributed among several players. The
two-party case, where two players, usually called Alice and Bob, cooperate in order to compute a function
of their respective inputs, has been widely studied with many important results; yet major questions in this
area are still open today (e.g., the log-rank conjecture, see [37]). The multi-party case, where k ≥ 3 players
cooperate in order to compute a function of their inputs, is much less understood.
A number of variants have been proposed in the literature to extend the two-party setting into the multi-
party one. In this paper we consider the more natural number-in-hand (NIH) setting, where each player has
its own input, as opposed to the so-called number-on-forehead (NOF) setting, where each player knows all
pieces of the input except one, its own. Moreover, also the communication structure between the players
in the multi-party setting was considered in the literature under a number of variants. For example, in the
blackboard (or broadcast) model the communication between the players is achieved by each player writing,
in turn, a message on the board, to be read by all other players. In the coordinator model, introduced in
[21], there is an additional entity, the coordinator, and all players communicate back and forth only with the
coordinator. The most natural setting is, however, the peer-to-peer message-passing model, where each pair
of players is connected by a communication link, and each player can send a separate message to any other
player. This latter setting has been studied, in the context of communication complexity, even less than the
other multi-party settings, probably due to the difficulty in tracking the distributed communication patterns
that occur during a run of a protocol in that setting. This setting is, however, not only the most natural
one, and the one that occurs the most in real systems, but is the setting studied widely in the distributed
algorithms and distributed computation communities, for complexity measures which are usually other than
communication complexity.
In the present paper we attempt to fill this gap in the study of peer-to-peer communication complexity,
and, further, to create a more solid bridge between the research field of communication complexity and
the research field of distributed computation. We propose a computation model, together with an informa-
tion theoretic complexity measure, for the analysis of the communication complexity of protocols in the
asynchronous multi-party peer-to-peer (number-in-hand) setting. We argue that our model is, on the one
hand, only a slight restriction over the asynchronous model usually used in the distributed computation lit-
erature, and, on the other hand, stronger than the models that have been previously suggested in order to
study communication complexity in the peer-to-peer setting common in the distributed computation litera-
ture (e.g., [21, 46]). Furthermore, our model lends itself to the analysis of communication complexity, most
notably using information theoretic tools.
Indeed, after defining our model and our information theoretic measure, that we call Multi-party In-
formation Cost (MIC), we prove a number of properties of that measure, and then prove a number of fun-
damental properties of protocols in our model. We then exemplify the effectiveness of our model and
information theoretic measure by proving two tight lower bounds. The more elaborate one is a tight lower
bound of Ω(kn), when n = Ω(k), on the peer-to-peer randomized communication complexity of the func-
tion set-disjointness (Disjnk ). This function is a basic, important function, which has been the subject
of a large number of studies in communication complexity, and is often seen as a test for our ability to give
lower bounds in a given model (cf. [16]). We note that the communication complexity of Disjointness in
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the two-party case is well understood [30, 42, 3, 7, 9]. From a quantitative point of view, our result for
peer-to-peer multi-party Disjointness improves by a log k factor the lower bound that could be deduced for
the peer-to-peer model from the lower bound on the communication complexity of Disjointness in the coor-
dinator model [8]. The second lower bound that we prove is a tight lower bound of Ω(kn), when n = Ω(k),
on the peer-to-peer randomized communication complexity of the bitwise parity function Parnk . Both our
lower bounds are obtained by giving a lower bound on the MIC of the function at hand, which yields the
lower bound on the communication complexity of that function. We believe that our lower bounds are the
first tight (non-trivial) lower bound on communication complexity in a peer-to-peer multi-party setting.1
It is important to note that, to the best of our knowledge, there is no known method to obtain tight lower
bounds on multi-party communication complexity in a peer-to-peer setting via lower bounds in other known
multi-party settings. Lower bounds obtained in the coordinator model can be transferred to the peer-to-peer
model at the cost of a log k factor, where k is the number of players, because any peer-to-peer protocol
can be simulated in the coordinator model by having the players attach to every message the identity of
the destination of that message [41, 22]. The loss of this factor in the lower bounds is unavoidable when
the communication protocols can exploit a flexible communication pattern, since there are examples of
functions where this factor in the communication complexity is necessary, while others, e.g., the parity
function of single-bit inputs, have the same communication complexity in the coordinator and peer-to-peer
settings (see a more detailed discussion on this point in Section 2.2). Therefore, one cannot prove tight
lower bounds in the peer-to-peer setting by proving corresponding results in the coordinator model. Note
that flexible communication configurations arise naturally for mobile communicating devices, for example,
when these devices exchange information with the nearby devices. Constructions based on the pointer
jumping problem also seem to be harder in the coordinator model, as solving the problem usually requires
exchanging information in a specific order determined by the inputs of the players. It is thus important to
develop lower bound techniques which apply directly in the peer-to-peer model, as we do in the present
paper. Information theoretic tools seem, as we show, most suitable for this task.
Information theoretic complexity measures. As indicated above, our work makes use of information
theoretic tools. Based on information theory, developed by Shannon [44], Information Complexity (IC),
originally defined in [2, 14], is a powerful tool for the study of two-party communication protocols. Infor-
mation complexity is a measure of how much information, about each other’s input, the players must learn
during the course of the protocol, if that protocol must compute the function correctly. Since IC can be
shown to provide a lower bound on the communication complexity, this measure has proven to be a strong
and useful tool for obtaining lower bounds on two-party communication complexity in a sequence of papers
(e.g., [3, 4, 11, 7]). However, information complexity cannot be extended in a straightforward manner to
the multi-party setting. This is because with three players or more, any function can be computed privately
(cf. [5, 19]), i.e., in a way such that the players learn nothing but the value of the function to compute. This
implies that the information complexity of any function is too low to provide a meaningful lower bound on
the communication complexity in the natural peer-to-peer multi-party setting. Therefore, before the present
paper, information complexity and its variants have been used to obtain lower bounds on multi-party com-
munication complexity only in settings which do not allow for private protocols (and most notably not in
the natural peer-to-peer setting), with the single exception of [31]. For example, a number of lower bounds
have been obtained via information complexity for a promise version of set-disjointness in the broadcast
model [3, 13, 27] (also cf. [29]), and external information complexity was used in [10] for a lower bound
on the general disjointness function, also in the broadcast model. In the coordinator model, lower bounds
1Lower bounds in a seemingly peer-to-peer setting were given in [46]. However, in the model of that paper, the communication
pattern is determined by an external view of the transcript, which makes the model equivalent to the coordinator model.
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on the communication complexity of set-disjointness were given via variants of information complexity [8].
The latter result was extended in [15] to the function Tribes. A notion of external information cost in the
coordinator model was introduced in [28] to study maximum matching in a distributed setting. We note
that the study of communication complexity in number-in-hand multi-party settings via techniques other
than those based on information theory is limited to very few papers. One such example is the technique
of symmetrization that was introduced for the coordinator model in [41], and was shown to be useful to
study functions such as the bitwise AND. That technique was further developed along with other reduction
techniques in [45, 46, 47]. Another example is the notion of strong fooling sets, introduced in [12] to study
deterministic communication complexity of discreet protocols, also defined in [12].
Private computation. It is well known that in the multi-party number-in-hand peer-to-peer setting, unlike in
the two-party case, any function can be privately computed [5, 19]. The model that we define in the present
paper does allow for (information theoretic) private computation of any function [5, 19, 1]. The minimum
amount of private randomness needed in order to compute privately a given function is often referred to in
this context as the randomness complexity of that function. Randomness complexity (in private computation)
is of interest because true randomness is considered a costly resource, and since randomness complexity in
private computation has been shown to be related to other complexity measures, such as the circuit size of
the function or its sensitivity. For example, it has been shown [38] that a boolean function f has a linear
size circuit if and only if f has constant randomness complexity. A small number of works [6, 36, 26, 31]
prove lower bounds on the randomness complexity of the parity function. The parity and other modulo-sum
functions are, to the best of our knowledge, the only functions for which randomness complexity lower
bounds are known. Using the information theoretic results that we obtain in the present paper for the set-
disjointness function, we are able to give a lower bound of Ω(n) on the randomness complexity of Disjnk .
The significance of this result lies in that it is the first such lower bound that grows with the size of the input
(which is kn), while the output remains a single bit, contrary to the sum function (see [6]) or the bitwise
parity function (see [31]).
1.1 Our techniques and contributions
Our contribution in the present paper is twofold.
First, on the conceptual, modeling and definitions side we lay the foundations for proving lower bounds
on (randomized) communication complexity in the natural peer-to-peer multi-party setting. Specifically, we
propose a model that, on the one hand, is a very natural peer-to-peer model, and very close to the model used
in the distributed computation literature, and, at the same time, does have properties that allow one to analyze
protocols in terms of their information complexity and communication complexity. While at first sight the
elaboration of such model does not seem to be a difficult task, many technical, as well as fundamental,
issues render this task non-trivial. For example, one would like to define a notion of “transcript” that would
guarantee both a relation between the length of the transcript and the communication complexity, and at
the same time will contain all the information that the players get and use while running the protocol. The
difficulty in elaborating such model may be the reason for which, prior to the present paper, hardly any work
studied communication complexity directly in a peer-to-peer, multi-party setting (cf. [22]), leaving the field
with only the results that can be inferred from other models, hence suffering the appropriate loss in the
obtained bounds. We propose our model (see Section 2.1) and prove a number of fundamental properties
that allow one to analyze protocols in that model (see Section 3.2), as well as prove the accurate relationship
between the entropy of the transcript and the communication complexity of the protocol (Proposition 2.4).
We then define our new information theoretic measure, that we call “Multi-party Information Cost”
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(MIC), intended to be applied to peer-to-peer multi-party protocols, and prove that it provides, for any (pos-
sibly randomized) protocol, a lower bound on the communication complexity of that protocol (Lemma 3.4).
We further show that MIC has certain properties such as a certain direct-sum property (Theorem 3.5). We
thus introduce a framework as well as tools for proving lower bounds on communication complexity in a
peer-to-peer multi-party setting.
Second, we exemplify the effectiveness of our conceptual contributions by proving, using the new tools
that we define, two tight lower bounds on the randomized communication complexity of certain functions
in the peer-to-peer multi-party setting. Both these lower bounds are proved by giving a lower bound on the
Multi-party Information Complexity of the function at hand. The more elaborate lower bound is a tight lower
bound of Ω(nk) on the randomized communication complexity of the function Disjnk (under the condition
that n = Ω(k)). The function Disjointness is a well studied function in communication complexity and is
often seen as a test-case of one’s ability to give lower bounds in a given model (cf. [16]). While the general
structure of the proof of this lower bound does have similarities to the proof of a lower bound for Disjointness
in the coordinator model [8],2 we do, even in the parts that bear similarities, have to overcome a number
of technical difficulties that require new ideas and new proofs. For example, the very basic rectangularity
property of communication protocols is, in the multi-party (peer-to-peer) setting, very sensitive to the details
of the definition of the model and the notion of a transcript. We therefore need first to give a proof of this
property in the peer-to-peer model (Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.7). We then use a distribution of the input
which is a modification over the distributions used in [8, 15] (see Section 5). Our proof proceeds, as in [8],
by proving a lower bound for the function AND, on a certain information theoretic measure that, in our
proof, is called SMIC (for Switched Multi-party Information Cost), and then, by using a direct-sum-like
lemma, to infer a lower bound on SMIC for Disjointness (we note that SMIC is an adaptation to the peer-
to-peer model of a similar measure used in [8]). However, the lack of a “coordinator” in a peer-to-peer
setting necessitates a definition of a more elaborate reduction protocol, and a more complicated proof for
the direct-sum argument, inspired by classic secret-sharing primitives. See Lemma 6.1 for our construction
and proof. We then show that SMIC provides a lower bound on MIC, which yields our lower bound on the
communication complexity of Disjointness.
We further give a tight lower bound of Ω(nk) on the randomized communication complexity of the
function Parnk (bitwise parity) in the peer-to-peer multi-party setting (under the condition that n = Ω(k)).
This proof proceeds by first giving a lower bound on MIC for the parity function Par1k, and then using a
direct-sum property of MIC to get a lower bound on MIC for Parnk . The latter yields the lower bound of
Ω(nk) on the communication complexity of Parnk .
To the best of our knowledge, our lower bounds are the first tight (non-trivial) lower bound on commu-
nication complexity in a peer-to-peer multi-party setting.
In addition to our results on communication complexity, we analyze the number of random bits necessary
for private computations [5, 19], making use of the model, tools and techniques we develop in the present
paper. It has been shown [31] that the public information cost (defined also in [31]) can be used to derive a
lower bound on the randomness complexity of private computations. In the present paper we give a lower
bound on the public information cost of any synchronous protocol computing the Disjointness function by
relating it to its Switched Multi-party Information Cost, which yields the lower bound on the randomness
complexity of Disjointness.
Organization. The appendix contains a short review of information theoretic notions that we use in the
present paper. We start the paper, in Section 2, by introducing our model and by comparing it to other mod-
els. In Section 3 we define our new information theoretic measure, MIC, and prove some of its properties,
2The lower bound in [8] would yield an Ω( 1
log k
· nk) lower bound in the peer-to-peer setting.
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and then prove a number of fundamental properties of protocols in our peer-to-peer model. In Section 4 we
give the lower bound for the bitwise parity function. In Section 5 we prove a lower bound on the switched
multi-party information cost of the function ANDk, and in Section 6, we prove, using the results of Sec-
tion 5, the lower bound on the communication complexity of the disjointness function Disjnk . In Section 7,
we show how to apply our information theoretic lower bounds in order to give a lower bound on the number
of random bits necessary for the private computation of the function Disjnk . Last, in Section 8 we discuss
some open questions.
2 Multi-party communication protocols
We start with our model, and, to this end, give a number of notations.
Notations. We denote by k the number of players. We often use n to denote the size (in bits) of the input to
each player. Calligraphic letters will be used to denote sets. Upper case letters will be used to denote random
variables, and given two random variables A andB, we will denote byAB the joint random variable (A,B).
Given a string (of bits) s, |s| denotes the length of s. Using parentheses we denote an ordered set (family)
of items, e.g., (Yi). Given a family (Yi), Y−i denotes the sub-family which is the family (Yi) without the
element Yi. The letter X will usually denote the input to the players, and we thus use the shortened notation
X for (Xi), i.e., the input to all players. A protocol will usually be denoted by π.
We now define a natural communication model which is a slight restriction of the general asynchronous
peer-to-peer model. The restriction of our model compared to the general asynchronous peer-to-peer model
is that for a given player at a given time, the set of players from which that player waits for a message before
sending any message of its own is determined by that player’s own local view, i.e., from that player’s input
and the messages it has read so far, as well as its private randomness, and the public randomness. This
allows us to define information theoretic tools that pertain to the transcripts of the protocols, and at the same
time to use these tools as lower bounds for communication complexity. This restriction however does not
exclude the existence of private protocols, as other special cases of the general asynchronous model do. We
observe that practically all multi-party protocols in the literature are implicitly defined in our model, and
that without such restriction, one bit of communication can bring log k bits of information, because not only
the content of the message, but also the identity of the sender may reveal information. To exemplify why the
general asynchronous model is problematic consider the following simple example (that we borrow from
our work in [31]).
Example 2.1. There are 4 players A, B and C , D. The protocol allows A to transmit to B its input bit x.
But all messages sent in the protocol are the bit 0, and the protocol generates only a single transcript over
all possible inputs. The protocol works as follows:
A: If x = 0 send 0 to C; after receiving 0 from C , send 0 toD.
If x = 1 send 0 toD; after receiving 0 from D, send 0 to C
B: After receiving 0 from a player, send 0 back to that player.
C,D: After receiving 0 from A send 0 to B. After receiving 0 from B send 0 to A.
It is easy to see that B learns the value of x from the order of the messages it gets.
In what follows we formally define our model, compare it to the general one and to other restricted ones,
and explain the usefulness and logic of our specific model.
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2.1 Definition of the model
Wework in amulti-party, number-in-hand, peer-to-peer setting. Each player 1 ≤ i ≤ k has unbounded local
computation power and, in addition to its inputXi, has access to a source of private randomness Ri. We will
use the notation R for (Ri), i.e., the private randomness of all players. A source of public randomness R
p is
also available to all players. We will call a protocol with no private randomness a public-coins protocol. The
system consists of k players and a family of k functions f = (fi)i∈[[1,k]], with ∀ i ∈ [[1, k]], fi : Πkℓ=1Xℓ →
Yi, where Xℓ denotes the set of possible inputs of player ℓ, and Yi denotes the set of possible outputs of
player i. The players are given some input x = (xi) ∈ Πki=1Xi, and for every i, player i has to compute
fi(x).
We define the communication model as follows, which is the asynchronous setting, with some restric-
tions. To make the discussion simpler we assume a global time which is unknown to the players. Every pair
of players is connected by a bidirectional communication link that allows them to send messages to each
other. There is no bound on the delivery time of a message, but every message is delivered in finite time,
and the communication link maintains FIFO order in each of the two directions. Given a specific time we
define the view of player i as the input of this player, Xi, its private randomness, Ri, the public randomness,
Rp, and the messages read so far by player i. After the protocol has started, each player runs the protocol
in local rounds. In each round, player i sends messages to some subset of the other players. The identity
of these players, as well as the content of these messages, depend on the current view of player i. The
player also decides whether it should stop, and output (or “return”) the result of the function fi. Then (if
player i did not stop and return the output), the player waits for messages from a certain subset of the other
players, this subset being also determined by the current view of the player. Then the (local) round of player
i terminates.3 To make it possible for the player to identify the arrival of the complete message that it waits
for, we require that each message sent by a player in the protocol is self-delimiting.
Denote byDℓi the set of possible views of player i at the end of local round ℓ, ℓ ≥ 0, where the beginning
of the protocol is considered round 0.
Formally, a protocol π is defined by a set of local programs, one for each player i, where the local program
of player i is defined by a sequence of functions, parametrized by the index of the local round ℓ, ℓ ≥ 1:
• Sℓ,si : D
ℓ−1
i → 2
{1,...,k}\{i}, defining the set of players to which player i sends the messages.
• mℓi,j : D
ℓ−1
i → {0, 1}
∗, such that for any Dℓ−1i ∈ D
ℓ−1
i , if j ∈ S
ℓ,s
i (D
ℓ−1
i ), then m
ℓ
i,j(D
ℓ−1
i ) is the
content of the message player i sends to player j. Each such message is self-delimiting.
• Oℓi : D
ℓ−1
i → {0, 1}
∗ ∪ {⊥}, defining whether or not the local program of player i stops and the
player returns its output, and what is that output. If the value is ⊥ then no output occurs. If the value
is y ∈ {0, 1}∗, then the local program stops and the player returns the value y.
• Sℓ,ri : D
ℓ−1
i → 2
{1,...,k}\{i}, defining the set of players from which player iwaits to receive a message.
To define the transcript of a protocol we proceed as follows. We first define k(k − 1) basic transcripts
Πri,j , denoting the transcript of the messages read by player i from its link from player j, and another k(k−1)
basic transcripts Πsi,j , denoting the transcript of the messages sent by player i on its link to player j.
We then define the transcript of player i, Πi, as the 2(k−1)-tuple of the 2(k−1) basic transcripts Πri,j ,Π
s
i,j ,
j ∈ [[1, k]] \ {i}. The transcript of the whole protocol Π is defined as the k-tuple of the k player transcripts
3The fact that the receiving of the incoming messages comes as the last step of the (local) round comes only to emphasize that
the sending of the messages and the output are a function of only the messages received in previous (local) rounds.
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Πi, i ∈ [[1, k]]. We denote by Πi(x, r) the transcript of player i when protocol π is run on input x and on
randomness (public and private of all players) r. By Πℓi(x, r) we denote Πi(x, r) modified such that all the
messages that player i sends in local rounds ℓ′ > ℓ, and all the messages that player i reads in local rounds
ℓ′ > ℓ are eliminated from the transcript. Observe that while Πri,j is always a prefix of Π
s
j,i, the definition of
a protocol does not imply that they are equal. Further observe that each bit sent in π appears in Π at most
twice.
We note that while seemingly the model that we introduce here is the same as the one used in [31], there
are important differences between the models, and that these differences are crucial for the properties that
we prove in the present paper to hold. See Section 2.2 for a comparison.
For a k-party protocol π we denote the set of possible inputs as X , and denote the projection of this set
on the i’th coordinate (i.e., the set of possible inputs for player i) by Xi. Thus X ⊆ X1 × · · · × Xk. The set
of possible transcripts for a protocol is denoted T , and the projection of this set on the i’th coordinate (i.e.,
the set of possible transcripts of player i) is denoted Ti. Observe that T ⊆ T1 × · · · × Tk.
Furthermore, in the course of the proofs, we sometimes consider a protocol that does not have access to
public randomness (but may have private randomness). We call such protocol a private-coins protocol.
We now formally define the notion of a protocol computing a given function with certain bounded error.
We will give most of the following definitions for the case where all functions fi are the same function, that
we denote by f . The definitions in the case of family of functions are similar.
Definition 2.2. For a given 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, a protocol π ǫ-computes a function f if for all x ∈ Πki=1Xi:
• For all possible assignments for the random sources Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and Rp, every player eventually
stops and returns an output.
• With probability at least 1 − ǫ (over all random sources) the following event occurs: each player i
outputs the value f(x), i.e., the correct value of the function.
We also consider the notion of external computation.
Definition 2.3. For a given 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, a protocol π externally ǫ-computes f if there ex-
ists a deterministic function θ taking as input the possible transcripts of π and verifying
∀ x ∈ X , Pr[θ(Π(x)) = f(x)] ≥ 1− ǫ.
The communication complexity of a protocol is defined as the worst case, over the possible inputs
and the possible randomness, of the number of bits sent by all players. For a protocol π we denote its
communication complexity by CC(π). For a given function f and a given 0 ≤ ǫ < 1, we denote by CCǫ(f)
the ǫ-error communication complexity of f , i.e., CCǫ(f) = inf
π ǫ-computing f
CC(π).
Finally, we give a proposition that relates the communication complexity of a k-party protocol π to the
entropy of the transcripts of the protocol π.
Proposition 2.4. Let the input to a k-party protocol π be distributed according to an arbitrary distribution.
Then,
∑k
i=1H(Πi) ≤ 4 · CC(π) + 4k
2, where the entropy is according to the input distribution and the
randomization of protocol π.
Proof. We first encode Πi, for any i, into a variable Π
′
i such that the set of possible values of Π
′
i is a prefix-
free set of strings. Observe that the transcript Πi is composed of a number of basic transcripts: for every
j ∈ [[1, k]] \ {i}, a pair of transcripts of messages, Πsi,j , Π
r
i,j containing the messages sent by player i to
player j, and the messages read by player i from player j, respectively. We convert Πi into Π
′
i as follows: In
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each one of the above 2(k − 1) components we replace every bit b ∈ {0, 1} by b.b, and then add at the end
of the component the two bits 01. We then concatenate all components in order. Clearly this a one-to-one
encoding, and the set of possible values of Π′i is a prefix-free set of strings.
Defining |Πi| =
∑
j 6=i
|Πsi,j |+ |Π
r
i,j | and |Π| =
k∑
i=1
|Πi|, we have H(Π′i) = H(Πi), and
E[|Π′i|] = 2E[|Πi|] + 4(k − 1).
We get
k∑
i=1
H(Πi) =
k∑
i=1
H(Π′i)
≤
k∑
i=1
E[|Π′i|] (by Theorem A.3)
≤
k∑
i=1
(2E[|Πi|] + 4(k − 1))
≤ 2 · E[|Π|] + 4k2
≤ 4 · CC(π) + 4k2 ,
where the last factor of 2 is due to the fact that each message sent from, say, player i to player j, may appear
in at most 2 basic transcripts Πsi,j and Π
r
j,i. y
2.2 Comparison to other models
The somewhat restricted model (compared to the general asynchronous model) that we work with allows
us to use information theoretic tools for the study of protocols in this model, and in particular to give
lower bounds on the multi-party communication complexity. Notice that the general asynchronous model is
problematic in this respect since one bit of communication can bring log k bits of information, because not
only the content of the message, but also the identity of the sender may reveal information. Thus, information
cannot be used as a lower bound on communication. In our case, the sets Sl,ri and S
l,s
i are determined by
the current view of the player, Π contains only the content of the messages, and thus the desirable relation
between the communication and the information is maintained. On the other hand, our restriction is natural,
does not seem to be very restrictive (practically all protocols in the literature adhere to our model), and
does not exclude the existence of private protocols. To exemplify why the general asynchronous model is
problematic see Example 2.1.
While the model that we introduce in the preset paper bears some similarities to the model used in [31],
there are a number of important differences between them. First, the definition of the transcript is different,
resulting in a different relation between the entropy of the transcript and the communication complexity.
More important is the natural property of the model in the present paper that the local program of a protocol
in a given node ends its execution when it locally gives its output. It turns out that the very basic rectan-
gularity property of protocols, used in many papers, holds in this case (and when the transcript is defied as
we define in the present paper), while if the local protocol may continue to operate after output, there are
examples where this property does not hold. Thus, we view the introduction of the present model also as
a contribution towards identifying the necessary features of a peer-to-peer model so that basic and useful
properties of protocols hold in the peer-to-peer setting.
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There has been a long series of works about multi-party communication protocols in different variants of
models, for example [21, 13, 27, 29, 41, 17, 18] (see [22] for a comparison of a few of these models). In the
coordinator model (cf. [21, 41, 8]), an additional player (the coordinator) with no input can communicate
privately with each player, and the players can only communicate with the coordinator. We first note that the
coordinator model does not yield exact bounds for the multi-party communication complexity in the peer-
to-peer setting (neither in our model nor in the most general one). Namely, any protocol in the peer-to-peer
model can be transformed into a protocol in the coordinator model with an O(log k) multiplicative factor in
the communication complexity, by sending each message to the coordinator with an O(log k)-bit label in-
dicating its destination. This factor is sometimes necessary, e.g., for the permutation functional defined
as follows: Given a permutation σ : [[1, k]] → [[1, k]], each player i has as input a bit bi and σ−1(σ(i) − 1)
and σ−1(σ(i) + 1) (i.e., each player has as input the indexes of the players before and after itself in the
permutation).4 For player i the function fi is defined as fi = bσ−1(σ(i)+1) (i.e., the value of the input bit of
the next player in the permutation σ). Clearly in our model the communication complexity of this function is
k (each player sends its input bit to the correct player), and the natural protocol is valid in our model. On the
other hand, in the coordinator model Ω(k log k) bits of communication are necessary. But this multiplicative
factor between the complexities in the two models is not always necessary: the communication complexity
of the parity function Par is Θ(k) both in the peer-to-peer model and in the coordinator model.
Moreover, when studying private protocols in the multi-party setting, the coordinator model does not
offer any insight. In the coordinator model, described in [21] and used for instance in [8], if one does not
impose any privacy requirement with respect to the coordinator, it is trivial to have a private protocol by
all players sending their input to the coordinator, and the coordinator returning the results to the players.
If there is a privacy requirement with respect to the coordinator, then if there is a random source shared
by all the players (but not the coordinator), privacy is always possible using the protocol of [23]. If no
such source exists, privacy is impossible in general. This follows from the results of Braverman et al. [8]
who show a non-zero lower bound on the total internal information complexity of all parties (including the
coordinator) for the function Disjointness in that model. Our model, on the other hand, does allow for the
private computation of any function [5, 19, 1].
It is worthwhile to contrast our model, and the communication complexity measure that we are con-
cerned with, with work in the so-call congested-clique model that has gained increasing attention in the
distributed computation literature (cf. [34, 35]). While both models are based on a communication network
in the form of a complete graph (i.e., every player can send messages to any other player, and these messages
can be different) there are two significant differences between them. Most of the works in the congested
clique model deal with graph-theoretic problems and the input to each player is related to the adjacency list
of a node (identified with that player) in the input graph, while in our model the input is not associated in any
way with the communication graph. More importantly, the congested clique model is a synchronous model
while ours is an asynchronous one. This brings about a major difference between the complexity measures
studied in each of the models. Work in the congested clique model is concerned with giving bounds on the
number of rounds necessary to fulfill a certain task under the condition that in each round each player can
send to any other player a limited number of bits (usually O(log k) bits). The measure of communication
complexity, that is of interest to us in the present paper, deals with the total number of communication bits
necessary to fulfill a certain task in an asynchronous setting without any notion of global rounds.5
4All additions are modulo k. This is a promise problem.
5Any function can be computed in the congested clique model with O(k) communication complexity (at a cost of having
many rounds) by each player, having input x, sending a single bit to player 1 only at round number x. On the other hand, in the
asynchronous model any function can be computed in a single “round” (at a cost of high communication complexity) by each player
sending its whole input to player 1.
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3 Tools for the study of multi-party communication protocols
In this section we consider two important tools for the study of peer-to-peer multi-party communication
protocols. First, we define and introduce an information theoretic measure that we callMulti-party Informa-
tion Cost (MIC); we later use it to prove our lower bounds. Then, we prove, in the peer-to-peer multi-party
model that we define, the so-called rectangularity property of communication protocols, that we also use in
our proofs.
3.1 Multi-party Information Cost
We now introduce an information theoretic measure for multi-party peer-to-peer protocols that we later
show to be useful for proving lower bounds on the communication complexity of multi-party peer-to-peer
protocols. We note that a somewhat similar measure was proposed in [8] for the coordinator model, but, to
the best of our knowledge, never found an application as a tool in a proof of a lower bound.
Definition 3.1. For any k-player protocol π and any input distribution µ, we define the multi-party infor-
mation cost of π:
MICµ(π) =
k∑
i=1
(I(X−i; Πi | XiRi) + I(Xi; Πi | X−iR−i)) .
Observe that the second part of each of the k summands can be interpreted as the information that player
i “leaks” to the other players on its input. While the “usual” intuitive interpretation of two-party IC is “what
Alice learns on Bob’s input plus what Bob learns on Alice’s input”, one can also interpret two-party IC as
“what Alice learns on Bob’s input plus what Alice leaks on her input”. Thus, MIC can be interpreted as
summing over all players i of “what player i learns on the other players’ inputs, plus what player i leaks on
its input.” Indeed, the expression defining MIC is equal to the sum, over all players i, of the two-party IC
for the two-party protocol that results from collapsing all players, except i, into one virtual player. Thus, for
number of players k = 2, MIC = 2 · IC. We note that defining our measure without the private randomness
in the condition of the mutual information expressions would yield the exact same measure (as is the case
for 2-party IC); we prefer however to define MIC with the randomness in the conditions, as we believe that
it allows one to give shorter, but still clear and accurate, proofs.
On the other hand observe that the second of the two mutual information expressions has X−i in the
condition, contrary to a seemingly similar measure used in [8] (Definition 3 in [8]). Our measure is thus
“internal” in nature, while the one of [8] has an “external” component. The fact thatMIC is “internal” allows
us to give lower bounds on MIC, and thus to use it for lower bounds on the communication complexity,
contrary to the measure of [8].
Further observe that the summation, over all players, of each one of the two mutual information expres-
sions alone would not yield a measure useful for proving lower bounds on the communication complexity
of functions. The first mutual information expression would yield a measure for functions that would never
be higher than the entropy of the function at hand, due to the existence of private protocols for all func-
tions [5, 19]. For the second mutual information expression there are functions for which that measure
would be far too low compared to the communication complexity: e.g., the function f = x1, x ∈ {0, 1}n
(i.e., the value of the function is the input of player 1); in that case the measure would equal only n, while
the communication complexity of that function is Ω(kn).
We now define the multi-party information complexity of a function.
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Definition 3.2. For any function f , any input distribution µ, and any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, we define the quantity
MICǫµ(f) = inf
π ǫ-computing f
MICµ(π) .
Definition 3.3. For any f , and any 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, we define the quantity
MICǫ(f) = inf
π ǫ-computing f
sup
µ
MICµ(π) .
We now claim that the multi-party information cost and the communication complexity of a protocol are
related, as formalized by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. For any k-player protocol π, and for any input distribution µ,
CC(π) ≥
1
8
MICµ(π)− k
2 .
Proof.
MICµ(π) =
k∑
i=1
(I(X−i; Πi | XiRi) + I(Xi; Πi | X−iR−i))
≤ 2
k∑
i=1
H(Πi)
≤ 8 · CC(π) + 8k2 ,
where the first inequality follows from Proposition A.2, and the last one from Proposition 2.4. y
We now show that the multi-party information cost satisfies a direct sum property for product distri-
butions. In what follows, the notation f⊗n denotes the task of computing n instances of f , where the
requirement from an ǫ-computing protocol is that each instance is computed correctly with probability at
least 1− ǫ (as opposed to the stronger requirement that the whole vector of instances is computed correctly
with probability at least 1− ǫ).
Theorem 3.5. For any protocol π (externally) ǫ-computing a function f⊗n, there exists a protocol π′ (ex-
ternally) ǫ-computing f such that, for any product distribution µ for the input, it holds that
MICµn(π) ≥ n ·MICµ(π
′) .
Proof. We define π′ on input (Yi)i∈[[1,k]] as follows. We denote by R′p the public randomness available to
the players, and by R′i the private randomness available to the players.
We consider the public and private randomness R′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and R
′p as strings of random bits. The
players first use the first bits of the public randomness to publicly sample a random index L uniformly in
[[1, n]], and defineXLi = Yi. The players then, using the next random bits of the public randomness, publicly
sample, for every d < L,Xd according to µ. Each player i then, using the first bits of its private randomness,
samples privately, for every d > L, Xdi according to µ. The player then run π on input X. They output as
the output of π′ the L’th coordinate of the output of π. Observe that π′ has error at most ǫ, and that if the
input to π′ is distributed according to µ, then the input of π is distributed according to µn.
Note that there is no extra communication in π′ compared to π, only some (private and public) sampling.
Therefore we have Π′i = Πi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ k. We further denote by R
p the random bits of R′p beyond
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those used by the public sampling at the start of π′. Similarly, we denote by Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the random bits
of R′i beyond those used by the private sampling at the start of π
′.
We now show that MICµ(π
′) = 1
n
MICµn(π). In what follows we explicitly state the public randomness
next to the transcript. Thus,
MICµ(π
′) =
k∑
i=1
(
I(Y−i;R′pΠ′i | YiR
′
i) + I(Yi;R
′pΠ′i | Y−iR
′
−i)
)
.
We have, for every player i,
I(Y−i;R′pΠ′i | YiR
′
i) = I(Y−i;LX
<LRpΠi | YiX
>L
i Ri) (making explicit the sampling from R
′
i,R
′p)
= I(Y−i;X<LRpΠi | YiX>Li Ri) (because I(Y−i;L | YiX
>L
i RiX
<LRpΠi) = 0)
= I(Y−i;RpΠi | YiX>Li RiX
<L) (because Y−i and X<L are independent)
= E
ℓ
[I(Xℓ−i;R
pΠi | X
ℓ
iX
>ℓ
i RiX
<ℓ)]
= E
ℓ
[I(Xℓ−i;R
pΠi | X
ℓ
iX
>ℓ
i RiX
<ℓ
i X
<ℓ
−i )]
= E
ℓ
[I(Xℓ−i;R
pΠi | XiRiX
<ℓ
−i )]
=
1
n
∑
ℓ
[I(Xℓ−i;R
pΠi | XiRiX
<ℓ
−i )]
=
1
n
I(X−i;RpΠi | XiRi) (chain rule) ,
and
I(Yi;R
′pΠ′i | Y−iR
′
−i) = I(Yi;LX
<LRpΠi | Y−iX>L−i R−i) (making explicit the sampling from R
′
i,R
′p)
= I(Yi;X
<LRpΠi | Y−iX>L−i R−i) (because I(Yi;L | Y−iX
>L
−i R−iX
<LRpΠi) = 0)
= I(Yi;R
pΠi | Y−iX>L−i R−iX
<L) (because Yi and X
<L are independent )
= E
ℓ
[I(Xℓi ;R
pΠi | X
ℓ
−iX
>ℓ
−iR−iX
<ℓ
−iX
<ℓ
i )]
= E
ℓ
[I(Xℓi ;R
pΠi | X−iR−iX<ℓi )]
=
1
n
∑
ℓ
[I(Xℓi ;R
pΠi | X−iR−iX<ℓi )]
=
1
n
I(Xi;R
pΠi | X−iR−i) (chain rule).
Summing over i ∈ [[1, k]] concludes the proof. y
3.2 The rectangularity property
Rectangularity. The rectangularity property (or Markov property) is one of the key properties that follow
from the structure and definition of (some) protocols. For randomized protocols it was introduced in the
two-party setting and in the multi-party blackboard model in [3], and in the coordinator model in [8]. We
prove a similar rectangularity property in the peer-to-peer model that we consider in the present paper.
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We note that the proof of this property in the peer-to-peer model makes explicit use of the specific
properties of the model we defined: the proof that follows explicitly uses the definition of the transcript on
an edge by edge basis as in our model, as well as the fact that a player returns and stops as one operation.
One can build examples where if any of these two properties does not hold, then the rectangularity property
of protools does not hold. Thus we view the following proof of rectangularity in our model also as an
identification of model properties needed for the useful rectangularity property of multiparty peer-to-peer
protocols to hold.
To define this property, for any transcript τ ∈ Ti, let Ai(τ) = {(x, r) | Πi(x, r) = τ} (i.e., the set of
input, randomness pairs that lead to transcript τ ), and define the projection of Ai(τ) on coordinate i as
Ii(τ ) = {(x
′, r′),∃ (x, r) ∈ Ai(τ), x′ = xi & r′ = ri} ,
and the projection of Ai(τ ) on the complement of coordinate i as
Ji(τ ) = {(x
′, r′),∃ (x, r) ∈ Ai(τ), x′ = x−i & r′ = r−i} .
Similarly, for any transcript τ ∈ T , let B(τ) = {(x, r) | Π(x, r) = τ)}, and for any player i, let Hi(τ) =
{(x′, r′),∃ (x, r) ∈ B(τ), x′ = x−i & r′ = r−i}.
We start by proving a combinatorial property of transcripts of communication protocols, which intu-
itively follows from the fact that each player has access to only its own input and private randomness. The
proof of this property is technically more involved compared to the analogous property in other settings,
since the structure of protocols and the manifestation of the transcripts in the peer-to-peer setting are more
flexible than in the other settings.
Lemma 3.6. Let π be a k-player private-coins protocol 6 with inputs from X = X1×· · ·×Xk. Let T denote
the set of possible transcripts of π, and for i ∈ [[1, k]] let Ti denote the set of possible transcript observed by
player i, so that T ⊆ T1 × · · · × Tk. Then, ∀ i ∈ [[1, k]]:
• ∀ τ ∈ Ti, Ai(τ) = Ii(τ)×Ji(τ ).
• ∀ τ ∈ T , B(τ) = Ii(τi)×Hi(τ).
Proof. We start by proving the first claim. Since the other inclusion is immediate from the definition, we
only need to show that
∀ τ ∈ Ti, Ii(τ)× Ji(τ) ⊆ Ai(τ ) .
To this end take an arbitrary (xi, ri) ∈ Ii(τ ) and an arbitrary (x−i, r−i) ∈ Ji(τ). Since (xi, ri) ∈ Ii(τ),
we have that ∃ (x˜, r˜) ∈ Ai(τ) s.t. xi = x˜i & ri = r˜i. Similarly, since (x−i, r−i) ∈ Ji(τ ),
∃ (xˆ, rˆ) ∈ Ai(τ ) | x−i = xˆ−i & r−i = rˆ−i .
Let (x, r) be ((xi, ri), (x−i, r−i)) ∈ Ii(τ )× Ji(τ). We will now show that
(x, r) ∈ Ai(τ) .
Let L be the number of local rounds of player i in the run of π on input (x, r). We will show by induction
on the index of the local round of player i that for any ℓ ≤ L, Πℓi(x, r) = Π
ℓ
i(x˜, r˜). Observe that whether
or not the protocol of a player stops and returns its output at a given round is a function of its input and its
6Recall that a private-coins protocol does not have access to public randomness, but may have private randomness.
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transcript until that round, as well as its private randomness. Therefore, since the protocol of player i stops
and returns its value at local round L if the input is (x, r), it will follow from ΠLi (x, r) = Π
L
i (x˜, r˜) that
player i stops and returns its output at local round L also when the input is (x˜, r˜). We will thus get that
Πi(x, r) = τ , and hence (x, r) ∈ Ai(τ).
The base of the induction, for ℓ = 0, follows since the transcript is empty. We now prove the claim for
ℓ+ 1 ≤ L, based on the induction hypothesis that the claim holds for ℓ.7
The messages that player i sends at local round ℓ+ 1 are a function of xi, ri and Π
ℓ
i(x, r). As xi = x˜i
and r˜i = ri, and using the induction hypothesis, we get that the messages sent by player i at local round
ℓ+ 1 are the same in πi(x, r) and in πi(x˜, r˜).
For the same reason we also get that the set of players from which player i waits for a message at round
ℓ+ 1 is the same when π is run on input in (x, r) and on input (x˜, r˜).
We now claim that the messages read by player i at round ℓ + 1 are the same when π is run on input
(x, r) and on input (x˜, r˜). To this end we define an imaginary “protocol” ψ where player i sends in its first
local round all the messages that it sends in τ , and the players inQi = [[1, k]]\{i} run π.8 Player i sends the
messages on each link according to the order in τ .9 The messages that the players inQi send in each of their
local rounds are a function of their inputs (and their local randomness) and the messages they read from the
links that connect to player i. Since Π(xˆ, rˆ) = τ , we can conclude that in ψ (when the input is (xˆ, rˆ)) the
messages sent by the players in Qi (in particular, to player i) are the same as those sent in π on input (xˆ, rˆ).
Recall that we have proved above that when π is run on (x, r), the messages player i sends up to round
ℓ + 1 are consistent with τ . We therefore can consider now a “protocol” ψ′ which is the same as ψ with
the only difference that player i sends (in its first local round) only the messages of τ it would have sent in
π(x, r) until (and including) round ℓ+ 1 (and not all the message it sends in τ ). It follows that in ψ′, when
run on input (xˆ, rˆ), the sequences of messages sent from the players in Qi to i are a prefix of the sequences
they send in ψ. Since x−i = xˆ and r−i = rˆ, the same claim holds when ψ′ is run on (x, r). Observe now
that when π is run on (x, r), at the time where player i is waiting at local round ℓ+1 for incoming messages
it, has sent exactly the messages that player i sends in ψ′.
Using the induction hypothesis Πℓi(x, r) = Π
ℓ
i(x˜, r˜), the fact hat xi = x˜i and ri = r˜i, and the fact that
the set of players from which player i waits for a message at local round ℓ+1 is the same for input (x, r) and
(x˜, r˜), we can conclude that the messages that player i reads while waiting for messages at local round ℓ+1
when π is run on (x, r) are consistent with the messages it would read when π is run on (x˜, r˜). Since player
i running π must, by the definition of a protocol, reach its “return” statement, it must receive messages from
all the players it is waiting for. We therefore conclude that the messages read by player i in local round ℓ+1
when π is run on (x, r) are the same as those it read when run on (x˜, r˜).
Together with the induction hypothesis, and the fact (proved above) that the messages sent by player i at
local round ℓ+1 are the same when π is run on in (x, r) and on (x˜, r˜), we have thatΠℓ+1i (x, r) = Π
ℓ+1
i (x˜, r˜).
We now prove the second claim. We only need to show that
∀ τ ∈ T , Ii(τi)×Hi(τ) ⊆ B(τ) ,
the other inclusion being immediate from the definitions, since B(τ) ⊆ Ai(τi).
Take an arbitrary (xi, ri) ∈ Ii(τi) and an arbitrary (x−i, r−i) ∈ Hi(τ). Since (x−i, r−i) ∈ Hi(τ),
∃ (xˆ, rˆ) s.t. π(xˆ, rˆ) = τ and x−i = xˆ−i and r−i = rˆ−i. Let (x, r) = ((xi, ri), (x−i, r−i)). Since
7Note that Πi(x, r) by itself does not define which messages are sent/read in which local round.
8Technically speaking, this is not a protocol according to our definition as more than one message may be sent in a single round
on a single link.
9Recall that a transcript of a players is a 2(k − 1)-tuple of transcripts, one for each of its 2(k − 1) directed links.
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B(τ) ⊆ A(τi), we have Hi(τ) ⊆ Ji(τi). Thus, using the first claim,
Ii(τi)×Hi(τ) ⊆ Ii(τi)× Ji(τi) ⊆ Ai(τi) ,
and Πi(x, r) = τi. It remains to show that ∀ j 6= i, Πj(x, r) = τj .
Consider the two runs of protocol π on the input (x, r) and on the input (xˆ, rˆ). We have thatΠ(xˆ, rˆ) = τ ,
and that Πi(x, r) = τi. Since x−i = xˆ−i and r−i = rˆ−i, we have that also for all j 6= i Πj(x, r) =
Πj(xˆ, rˆ) = τj . It follows that (x, r) ∈ B(τ) as needed.
y
We now prove the rectangularity property of randomized protocols in the peer-to-peer setting. It follows
from Lemma 3.6 and straightforward calculations. The full proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 3.7. Let π be a k-player private-coins protocol with inputs from X = X1× · · · ×Xk. Let T denote
the set of possible transcripts of π, and for i ∈ [[1, k]] let Ti denote the set of possible transcript observed by
player i, so that T ⊆ T1 × · · · × Tk. Then for every i ∈ [[1, k]], there exist functions qi : Xi × Ti → [0, 1],
q−i : X−i × Ti → [0, 1] and p−i : X−i × T → [0, 1] such that
∀ x ∈ X ,∀ τ = (τ1, . . . , τk) ∈ T ,Pr[Πi(x) = τi] = qi(xi, τi)q−i(x−i, τi) ,
and
∀ x ∈ X ,∀ τ = (τ1, . . . , τk) ∈ T ,Pr[Π(x) = τ ] = qi(xi, τi)p−i(x−i, τ) .
The following lemma formalizes the fact that the distribution of the transcript of a protocol that externally-
computes a function f must differ on two inputs with different values of f (see also [3]). The proof is
deferred to the appendix.
Lemma 3.8. Let f be a k-party function, and let π be a protocol externally ǫ-computing f . If x and y are
two inputs such that f(x) 6= f(y), then h(Π(x),Π(y)) ≥ 1−2ǫ√
2
.
The Diagonal Lemma. The following lemma is often called the diagonal lemma. It was proved in [3] for
the two-party setting under the name of the Pythagorean lemma, and in [8] for the coordinator model. We
show here that is also holds in the peer-to-peer model. This lemma follows from Lemma 3.7 and Proposi-
tion A.12 in the same way that its two-party analogue follows from the analogous lemma and proposition.
For completeness we give the proof in the appendix. For x ∈ {0, 1}k and b ∈ {0, 1}, let x[i←b] represent the
input obtained from x by replacing the ith bit of x by b.
Lemma 3.9. Let π be a k-party private-coins protocol taking input in {0, 1}k . Then ∀ x ∈ {0, 1}k , ∀ y ∈
{0, 1}k , ∀ i ∈ [[1, k]], h2(Π(x),Π(y)) ≥ 12
[
h2(Π(x),Π(y[i←xi])) + h
2(Π(x[i←yi]),Π(y))
]
.
4 The function parity
We now prove a lower bound on the multi-party peer-to-peer randomized communication complexity of the
k-party n-bit parity function Parnk , defined as follows: each player i receives n bits (x
p
i )p∈[[1,n]] and player 1
has to output the bitwise sum modulo 2 of the inputs, i.e.,
Parnk(x) =
(
⊕ki=1x
1
i ,⊕
k
i=1x
2
i , . . . ,⊕
k
i=1x
n
i
)
(the case where all k players compute the function is trivial). To start, we prove a lower bound on the multi-
party information complexity of the parity function, where each player has a single input bit. For simplicity
we denote this function Park, rather than Par
1
k.
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Theorem 4.1. Let µ be the uniform distribution on {0, 1}k . Given any fixed 0 ≤ ǫ < 12 , for any protocol π
ǫ-computing Park, it holds that MICµ(π) = Ω(k).
Proof.
MICµ(π) =
k∑
i=1
(I(X−i; Πi | XiRi) + I(Xi; Πi | X−iR−i))
≥
k∑
i=2
I(Xi; Πi | X−iR−i)
=
k∑
i=2
(I(Xi; Πi | X−iR−i) + I(Xi; Π1 | X−iR−iΠi)) (as H(Π1 | X−iR−iΠi) = 0)
=
k∑
i=2
I(Xi; Π1Πi | X−iR−i) (chain rule)
≥
k∑
i=2
I(Xi; Π1 | X−iR−i)
=
k∑
i=2
(H(Xi | X−iR−i)−H(Xi | X−iR−iΠ1))
=
k∑
i=2
(1−H(Xi | X−iR−iΠ1)) (because Xi is uniform and independent of X−i and of R−i)
≥
k∑
i=2
(1−H(Park(X) | X−iR−iΠ1)) (data processing inequality, as ∃ Φ | Xi = Φ(Park(X),X−i))
≥
k∑
i=2
(1−H(Park(X) | X1R1Π1))
≥ (k − 1)(1 −H(Park(X) | X1R1Π1))
≥ (k − 1)(1 − h(ǫ)) (since player 1 outputs Park(X) with error ǫ; see Claim B.1) .
y
The next theorem follows immediately from Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 3.5.
Theorem 4.2. Let µ be the uniform distribution on {0, 1}k . Given any fixed 0 ≤ ǫ < 12 , for any protocol π
ǫ-computing Parnk , it holds that MICµn(π) = Ω(kn).
We can now prove a lower bound on the communication complexity of Parnk . Note that the lower bound
for Parnk given in [31] is valid only for a restricted class of protocols, called “oblivious” in [31].
Theorem 4.3. Given any fixed 0 ≤ ǫ < 12 , there is a constant α such that for n ≥
1
α
k,
CCǫ(Parnk) = Ω(kn) .
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Proof. Let π be a protocol ǫ-computing Parnk . By Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 4.2, there exists a constant β
such that CC(π) ≥ βkn− k2. Let α < β be a constant. For n ≥ 1
α
k, we have k2 ≤ αkn and we get
CC(π) ≥ (β − α)kn = Ω(kn).
y
5 The function AND
In this section we consider an arbitrary k-party protocol, π, where each player has an input bit xi, and where
π has to compute the AND of all the input bits. We prove a lower bound on a certain information theoretic
measure (that we define below) for π. The proof makes use of a certain input distribution that we will define
below. In the proof we use the following notations. Denote by 1
t
the all-1 bit-vector of length t. Denote by
eta1,...,ad the vector obtained from 1
t
by changing the bit 1 into the bit 0 at indexes a1, . . . , ad. To simplify
notations, we sometimes omit the superscript t when t = k, and write ea1,...,ad or 1. We further use in the
sequel the notation δa,b for the Kronecker delta, i.e., δa,b = 1 if a = b and 0 otherwise.
Input distribution. Consider the distribution µ defined as follows. Draw a bit M ∼ Ber(23 ,
1
3), and a
uniformly random index Z ∈ [[1, k]]. Assign 0 to XZ . If M = 0, sample X−Z uniformly in {0, 1}k−1; if
M = 1, assign 1k−1 toX−Z . We will also work with the product distribution µn. Our distribution is similar
to the ones of [8, 15] in that it leads to a high information cost (or similar measures) for the function ANDk.
The distribution that we use has the property that the AND of any input in the support of µ is 0. This allows
us to prove lower bounds for the Disjointness function without the constraint that k = Ω(log n) which was
necessary in [8] (but not in [15]).
Given a protocol π, let Πi[xi,m, z] denote the distribution of Πi, when the input X is sampled as
follows: X ∼ µ, conditioned on the fact that Xi = xi,M = m and Z = z.
5.1 Basic properties
We first prove a number of basic properties of π, under the input distribution µ. The proofs make use of the
general properties of protocols, proved in Section 3.2.
Rectangularity. We first prove the following lemma, which is an application of Lemma 3.7 to the specific
case of the distribution µ that we defined above. Its proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 5.1. Let π be a private-coins protocol. Let T denote the set of possible transcripts of π, and for
i ∈ [[1, k]] let Ti denote the set of possible transcript of by player i so that T ⊆ T1 × · · · × Tk. Then
there exists a function c : {0, 1} × [[1, k]] × T → [0, 1], and for every i ∈ [[1, k]] there is a function
ci : {0, 1} × [[1, k]] × Ti → [0, 1], such that ∀ i ∈ [[1, k]], ∀ x′ ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ m ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ z ∈ [[1, k]] \ {i},
∀ τ = (τ1, . . . , τk) ∈ T ,
Pr[Πi = τi | Xi = x
′,M = m,Z = z] = qi(x′, τi)ci(m, z, τi) ,
and
Pr[Π = τ | Xi = x
′,M = m,Z = z] = qi(x′, τi)c(m, z, τ) .
Diagonal lemma. The following lemma is a version of Lemma 3.9 adapted to our distribution. Its proof is
given in the appendix.
Lemma 5.2. Let π be a private-coins protocol. For any i, j ∈ [[1, k]] with i 6= j, we have h2(Πi[0, 0, j],Πi [1, 1, j]) ≥
1
2h
2(Πi(ei,j),Πi(ej)).
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Localization. The following lemma formalizes the fact that if changing the input of a player changes
the transcript of the protocol, then this change necessarily appears in the partial transcript of that player.
For randomized protocols this change is observed and quantified by the Hellinger distance between the
distributions of the transcripts. The proof is given in the appendix.
Lemma 5.3. Let π be a private-coins protocol. ∀i ∈ [[1, k]], ∀j ∈ [[1, k]] \ {i},
h(Πi(ei,j),Πi(ej)) = h(Π(ei,j),Π(ej)) .
5.2 Switched multi-party information cost of ANDk
We propose the following definition, which is an adaptation of the switched information cost of [8]. We call
it Switched Multi-party Information Cost (SMIC).
Definition 5.4. For a k-player protocol π with inputs drawn from µn let
SMICµn(π) =
k∑
i=1
(I(Xi; Πi |MZ) + I(M ; Πi | XiZ)) .
Note that the notion of SMIC is only defined with respect to the distribution µn that we defined, and we
may thus omit the distribution from the notation. We note that in order to simplify the expressions we often
consider the public randomness as implicit in the information theoretic expressions we use below. It can be
materialized either as part of the transcript or in the conditioning of the information theoretic expressions.
We can now prove the main result of this section.
Theorem 5.5. For any fixed 0 ≤ ǫ < 12 , for any protocol π externally ǫ-computing ANDk,
SMICµ(π) = Ω(k) .
Proof. We prove below the claim for an arbitrary private-coins protocol π. The claim for general proto-
cols (i.e., with public randomness) then follows from averaging over all possible assignments to the public
randomness.
Observe that by the definition of µ, for any i ∈ [[1, k]], ifM = 0 and Z = z 6= i, then Xi ∼ Ber(
1
2 ,
1
2).
We therefore get by Lemma A.13 that
∀i ∈ [[1, k]], ∀z ∈ [[1, k]] \ {i}, I(Xi; Πi |M = 0, Z = z) ≥ h
2(Πi[0, 0, z],Πi[1, 0, z]) . (1)
Similarly, by the definition of µ we have that for any i ∈ [[1, k]], if Xi = 1 and Z = z 6= i, then
M ∼ Ber(12 ,
1
2), and we get by Lemma A.13 that
∀i ∈ [[1, k]], ∀z ∈ [[1, k]] \ {i}, I(M ; Πi | Xi = 1, Z = z) ≥ h
2(Πi[1, 0, z],Πi[1, 1, z]) . (2)
Let us now define SMICi(π) = I(Xi; Πi |MZ) + I(M ; Πi | XiZ), so that SMIC(π) =
k∑
i=1
SMICi(π).
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We get
SMICi(π) = I(Xi; Πi |MZ) + I(M ; Πi | XiZ)
= E
z
[I(Xi; Πi |M,Z = z) + I(M ; Πi | Xi, Z = z)]
≥
1
k
∑
z 6=i
[I(Xi; Πi |M,Z = z) + I(M ; Πi | Xi, Z = z)]
≥
1
k
∑
z 6=i
[Pr[M = 0 | Z = z]I(Xi; Πi |M = 0, Z = z) +
Pr[Xi = 1 | Z = z]I(M ; Πi | Xi = 1, Z = z)] .
By the definition of µ, Pr[M = 0 | Z = z] = 23 for any z. Also, for any i 6= z,
Pr[Xi = 1 | Z = z] = Pr[M = 0 | Z = z] Pr[Xi = 1 |M = 0, Z = z]
+ Pr[M = 1 | Z = z] Pr[Xi = 1 |M = 1, Z = z]
=
2
3
·
1
2
+
1
3
· 1 =
2
3
.
Thus, using Inequalities (1) and (2), we have
SMICi(π) ≥
1
k
∑
z 6=i
[
2
3
h2(Πi[0, 0, z],Πi [1, 0, z]) +
2
3
h2(Πi[1, 0, z],Πi[1, 1, z])
]
≥
1
3k
∑
z 6=i
[h(Πi[0, 0, z],Πi [1, 0, z]) + h(Πi[1, 0, z],Πi[1, 1, z])]
2
≥
1
3k
∑
z 6=i
h2(Πi[0, 0, z],Πi[1, 1, z]) (by the triangular inequality).
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We have
SMIC(π) =
k∑
i=1
SMICi(π)
≥
1
3k
∑
i,z|i 6=z
h2(Πi[0, 0, z],Πi[1, 1, z])
≥
1
3k
∑
{i,z}
[h2(Πi[0, 0, z],Πi[1, 1, z]) + h
2(Πz[0, 0, i],Πz [1, 1, i])]
≥
1
6k
∑
{i,z}
[h2(Πi(ei,z),Πi(ez)) + h
2(Πz(ei,z),Πz(ei))] (by Lemma 5.2)
≥
1
6k
∑
{i,z}
[h2(Π(ei,z),Π(ez)) + h
2(Π(ei,z),Π(ei))] (by Lemma 5.3)
≥
1
12k
∑
{i,z}
[h(Π(ei,z),Π(ez)) + h(Π(ei,z),Π(ei))]
2
≥
1
12k
∑
{i,z}
h2(Π(ei),Π(ez)) (by the triangular inequality)
≥
1
24k
∑
{i,z}
h2(Π(ei),Π(1)) (by Lemma 3.9, omitting part of the right hand side term)
≥
1
24k
∑
{i,z}
(1− 2ǫ)2
2
(by Lemma 3.8)
≥
(k − 1)(1 − 2ǫ)2
96
= Ω(k) .
y
6 The function Disjointness
In the k players n-bit disjointness function Disjnk , every player i ∈ [[1, k]] has an n-bit string (x
ℓ
i)ℓ∈[[1,n]],
and the players have to output 1 if and only if there exists a coordinate ℓ where all players have the bit 1.
Formally, Disjnk(x) =
∨n
ℓ=1
∧k
i=1 x
ℓ
i .
6.1 Switched multi-party information cost of Disjnk
We first prove a direct-sum-type property which allows us to make the link between the functions ANDk
and Disjnk . A similar property was proved in [8] in the coordinator model; our peer-to-peer model requires
a different, more involved, construction, since we do not have the coordinator, and moreover no player can
act as the coordinator since it would get too much information. Since Disjnk is the disjunction of n ANDk
functions, we analyze the switched multi-party information cost of Disjnk using the distribution µ
n.
Lemma 6.1. Let k > 3. For any protocol π externally ǫ-computing Disjnk , there exists a protocol π
′ exter-
nally ǫ-computing ANDk such that
SMICµn(π) ≥ n · SMICµ(π
′) .
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Proof. Based on an arbitrary protocol π for Disjnk , we define a protocol π
′ for ANDk, and then analyze
SMICµn(π) and SMICµ(π
′). Let u ∈ {0, 1}k be the input to π′ such that ui is given to player i. We note that
we cannot use a protocol similar to the one used in [8] since in the peer-to-peer setting one does not have
a coordinator that can sample the inputs for the player. We thus need to sample the inputs in a distributed
way, while keeping the information complexity under control using classic secret sharing techniques. The
protocol π′ is defined as follows.
1. The players first sample publicly an index L uniformly in [[1, n]], and then sample publicly Zt, for
t ∈ [[1, n]] \ {L}, independently and uniformly in [[1, k]].
2. They then proceed to sample M t, for t ∈ [[1, n]] \ {L}, as follows. The set of players is partitioned
into two subsets, {1, 2} and {3, . . . , k}. Player 1 samplesM1 . . .ML−1 and sends the sampled values
to player 2 (player 3 samplesML+1 . . .Mn, see below).
3. Then Player 1 samplesX11 . . . X
L−1
1 according to the distribution µ, and player 2 samplesX
1
2 . . . X
L−1
2 ,
according to the distribution µ. Observe that they can do this as they knowM1, . . . ,ML−1, Z1, . . . , ZL−1.
4. Players 1 and 2 then apply the following procedure to communicate Xtj to player j, for j > 2 and
t < L: Player 1 sends a bit ptj to player j, and sends a bit v
t
j to player 2. Player 2 then sends a bit q
t
j
to player j. Player j then defines Xtj = p
t
j ⊕ q
t
j . The bits p
t
j , q
t
j and v
t
j are generated in the following
way.
• If Zt = j player 1 privately samples a random bit vtj . It then sets p
t
j = v
t
j . Player 2 sets q
t
j = v
t
j .
Player j thus defines Xtj = 0.
• If Zt 6= j and M t = 0, player 1 privately samples two independent random bits ptj and v
t
j .
Player 2 privately samples a random bit qtj . The bit X
t
j defined by player j is in this case a
uniform random bit. Note that it is not necessary for the correctness of the protocol that bit vtj is
sent to Player 2 in this case; it is sent here only to make our notations simpler.
• If Zt 6= j andM t = 1, player 1 privately samples a random bit vtj . It then sets p
t
j = v
t
j . Player
2 defines qtj = v
t
j ⊕ 1. Player j thus defines X
t
j = 1.
5. Player 3 samples ML+1 . . .Mn and sends the sampled values to players 4 to k. Every player i ≥ 3
privately samples XL+1i . . . X
n
i .
6. Players 3 and 4 then apply the same procedure as players 1 and 2, in order to communicate Xtj to
player j, for j ≤ 2 and t > L. We denote by pt1 and by p
t
2 the bits sent by player 3 to player 1
and to player 2, respectively; by qt1 and by q
t
2 the bits sent by player 4 to player 1 and to player 2,
respectively; and by vt1 and by v
t
2 the bits sent by player 3 to player 4.
7. Now all the players run protocol π, on the input composed of (1) the values defined above for xti,
i ∈ [[1, k]], t ∈ [[1, n]] \ {L} , and (2) xLi = ui, for i ∈ [[1, k]].
8. The output of the protocol π′ is the output of the protocol π.
First observe that if π computes Disjnk with error ǫ, then π
′ computes ANDk with error ǫ, and this is
regardless of the values of the random bits used in the construction of the input to π (this property of the
distribution of the input to π is called collapsing on coordinate L in, e.g., [8]).
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Now observe that if the input to protocol π′, denote it U , is distributed according to µ (as defined above)
then the definition of π′ guarantees that the input to protocol π,X, is distributed according to µn. Using the
notation we use for µ we can write that if (U,N, S) ∼ µ then (X,M,Z) ∼ µn.
We now give an upper bound on SMICµ(π
′) in terms of SMICµn(π). To this end we first express the
transcripts of protocol π′, Π′i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, in terms of the transcripts (Πi) of the protocol π, run in Step 7.
Let us take player 2 and express Π′2 as a function of Π2. Taking into account the preliminary sampling
procedure of protocol π′, we can write Π′2 in four parts.
1. The values which are a function of the public randomness used by π′: L,Z−L (for simplicity we
include the sampled values and not the random bits).
2. • Read by player 2 (and sent by player 1),M<L.
• Read by player 2 (and sent by player 1), all the vtj for j > 2, t < L (denoted below as v
<L
>2 ).
• Sent by player 2, all the qtj , for j > 2, t < L (denoted below as q
<L
>2 ).
3. Player 2 also receives pL+12 . . . p
n
2 , q
L+1
2 . . . q
n
2 from players 3 and 4 (denoted below as p
>L
2 and q
>L
2 ).
4. The last part is the transcript of player 2 when running π.
Thus, the transcript Π′2 can be written as LZ
−LM<Lv<L>2 q
<L
>2 p
>L
2 q
>L
2 Π2. However, in the manipulations
of SMIC we can write Π′2 also as Z
−LM<LX>L2 Π2. This is because
I(U2; Π
′
2 | NS) + I(N ; Π
′
2 | U2S) = I(U2;LZ
−LM<Lv<L>2 q
<L
>2 p
>L
2 q
>L
2 Π2 | NS)+
I(N ;LZ−LM<Lv<L>2 q
<L
>2 p
>L
2 q
>L
2 Π2 | U2S)
= I(U2;LZ
−LM<Lv<L>2 q
<L
>2X
>L
2 Π2 | NS)+
I(N ;LZ−LM<Lv<L>2 q
<L
>2X
>L
2 Π2 | U2S)
= I(U2;Z
−LM<LX>L2 Π2 | NS) + I(U2;Lv
<L
>2 q
<L
>2 | NSZ
−LM<LX>L2 Π2)+
I(N ;Z−LM<LX>L2 Π2 | U2S) + I(N ;Lv
<L
>2 q
<L
>2 | U2SZ
−LM<LX>L2 Π2)
= I(U2;Z
−LM<LX>L2 Π2 | NS) + I(N ;Z
−LM<LX>L2 Π2 | U2S) ,
where the second equality follows from the fact that the distribution of pt2q
t
2, for all t > L, is uniform for
pt2 ⊕ q
t
2 = x
t
2 and independent of U2 (resp., of N), conditioned on X
>L
2 , the rest of the transcript Π
′
2, and
S (resp., U2); the third equality follows from the chain rule; and the last equality follows from the fact that
I(U2;Lv
<L
>2 q
<L
>2 | NSZ
−LM<LX>L2 Π2) = 0 and I(N ;Lv
<L
>2 q
<L
>2 | U2SZ
−LM<LX>L2 Π2) = 0. These
last two equations follow from the fact that Lv<L>2 q
<L
>2 is independent of U2 (resp., of N ), even conditioned
on SZ−LM<LX>L2 Π2 and on N (resp., on U2).
By similar argument we can write, in the manipulations of SMIC, Π′1 as Z
−LM<LX>L1 Π1, and for
i ≥ 3, Π′i as Z
−LM>LX<Li Πi.
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We have
SMICµ(π
′) =
k∑
i=1
(
I(Ui; Π
′
i | NS) + I(N ; Π
′
i | UiS)
)
= E
ℓ
[
2∑
i=1
(
I(Xℓi ;Z
−ℓM<ℓX>ℓi Πi |M
ℓZℓ) + I(M ℓ;Z−ℓM<ℓX>ℓi Πi | X
ℓ
iZ
ℓ)
)
+
k∑
i=3
(
I(Xℓi ;Z
−ℓM>ℓX<ℓi Πi |M
ℓZℓ) + I(M ℓ;Z−ℓM>ℓX<ℓi Πi | X
ℓ
iZ
ℓ)
)]
= E
ℓ
[
2∑
i=1
(
I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
>ℓ
i M
≤ℓZ) + I(M ℓ; Πi | X≥ℓi M
<ℓZ)
)
+
k∑
i=3
(
I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
<ℓ
i M
≥ℓZ) + I(M ℓ; Πi | X≤ℓi M
>ℓZ)
)]
.
Now, applying Lemma A.9, we have that for any ℓ
I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
>ℓ
i M
≤ℓZ) ≤ I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
>ℓ
i MZ) (since I(X
ℓ
i ;M
>ℓ | X>ℓi M
≤ℓZ) = 0),
I(M ℓ; Πi | X
≥ℓ
i M
<ℓZ) ≤ I(M ℓ; Πi | XiM
<ℓZ) (since I(M ℓ;X<ℓi | X
≥ℓ
i M
<ℓZ) = 0),
I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
<ℓ
i M
≥ℓZ) ≤ I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
<ℓ
i MZ) (since I(X
ℓ
i ;M
<ℓ | X<ℓi M
≥ℓZ) = 0),
I(M ℓ; Πi | X
≤ℓ
i M
>ℓZ) ≤ I(M ℓ; Πi | XiM
>ℓZ) (since I(M ℓ;X>ℓi | X
≤ℓ
i M
>ℓZ) = 0).
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Thus
SMICµ(π
′) ≤ E
ℓ
[
2∑
i=1
(
I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
>ℓ
i MZ) + I(M
ℓ; Πi | XiM
<ℓZ)
)
+
k∑
i=3
(
I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
<ℓ
i MZ) + I(M
ℓ; Πi | XiM
>ℓZ)
)]
≤
1
n
n∑
ℓ=1
[
2∑
i=1
(
I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
>ℓ
i MZ) + I(M
ℓ; Πi | XiM
<ℓZ)
)
+
k∑
i=3
(
I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
<ℓ
i MZ) + I(M
ℓ; Πi | XiM
>ℓZ)
)]
≤
1
n
[
2∑
i=1
(
1∑
ℓ=n
I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
>ℓ
i MZ) +
n∑
ℓ=1
I(M ℓ; Πi | XiM
<ℓZ)
)
+
k∑
i=3
(
n∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓi ; Πi | X
<ℓ
i MZ) +
1∑
ℓ=n
I(M ℓ; Πi | XiM
>ℓZ)
)]
≤
1
n
[
2∑
i=1
(I(Xi; Πi |MZ) + I(M ; Πi | XiZ))
+
k∑
i=3
(I(Xi; Πi |MZ) + I(M ; Πi | XiZ))
]
≤
1
n
k∑
i=1
(I(Xi; Πi |MZ) + I(M ; Πi | XiZ))
≤
1
n
SMICµn(π) .
y
Coupled with the lower bound on SMIC(π′) for any protocol π′ that computes ANDk (Section 5), the
above lemma gives us a lower bound on SMIC(π) for any protocol that computes the function Disjnk :
Theorem 6.2. Let k > 3. Given any fixed 0 ≤ ǫ < 12 , for any protocol π externally ǫ-computing Disj
n
k it
holds that
SMICµn(π) = Ω(kn) .
6.2 Multi-party information complexity and communication complexity of Disjnk
We now prove a lemma that will allow us to obtain a lower bound on the multi-party peer-to-peer commu-
nication complexity of the disjointness function.
Lemma 6.3. For any k-player protocol π, SMICµn(π) ≤ MICµn(π).
Proof. We first prove that
∀ i ∈ [[1, k]], I(M ; Πi | XiRiZ) ≤ I(X−i; Πi | XiRi) .
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I(M ; Πi | XiRiZ) ≤ I(MX−i; Πi | XiRiZ)
= I(X−i; Πi | XiRiZ) + I(M ; Πi | XRiZ) (chain rule)
≤ I(X−i; Πi | XiRiZ) + I(M ; ΠiR−i | XRiZ)
= I(X−i; Πi | XiRiZ) + I(M ;R−i | XRiZ) + I(M ; Πi | XRZ) (chain rule)
= I(X−i; Πi | XiRiZ) + I(M ; Πi | XRZ)
≤ I(X−i; Πi | XiRiZ) +H(Πi | XRZ)
= I(X−i; Πi | XiRiZ) (because XR determines Πi)
= H(Πi | XiRiZ)−H(Πi | XRiZ)
= H(Πi | XiRiZ)−H(Πi | XRi)
≤ H(Πi | XiRi)−H(Πi | XRi)
≤ I(X−i; Πi | XiRi) .
We now prove that
∀ i ∈ [[1, k]], I(Xi; Πi |MZ) ≤ I(Xi; Πi | X−iR−i).
Since by the definition of µ I(Xi;X−iR−i |MZ) = 0, we get by Lemma A.9 that
I(Xi; Πi |MZ) ≤ I(Xi; Πi | X−iR−iMZ) ,
and
I(Xi; Πi | X−iR−iMZ) = H(Πi | X−iR−iMZ)−H(Πi | XR−iMZ)
= H(Πi | X−iR−iMZ)−H(Πi | XR−i)
≤ H(Πi | X−iR−i)−H(Πi | XR−i)
= I(Xi; Πi | X−iR−i) .
Thus we have
I(Xi; Πi |MZ) ≤ I(Xi; Πi | X−iR−i) .
Summing over i ∈ [[1, k]] concludes the proof. y
The next theorem follows immediately from Theorem 6.2 and Lemma 6.3.
Theorem 6.4. Let k > 3. Given any fixed 0 ≤ ǫ < 12 , for any protocol π externally ǫ-computing Disj
n
k , it
holds that
MICµn(π) = Ω(kn) .
We now conclude with a lower bound on the randomized communication complexity of the disjointness
function.
Theorem 6.5. Given any fixed 0 ≤ ǫ < 12 , there is a constant α such that for n ≥
1
α
k,
CCǫ(Disjnk) = Ω(kn) .
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Proof. For k = 3 the theorem follows from the fact that CCǫ(Disjn3 ) ≥ CC
ǫ(Disjn2 ) (simply by letting Alice
simulate internally a third player with an all-1 input), and from CCǫ(Disjn2 ) = Ω(n) (cf. [16]).
Assume now that k > 3. Let π be a protocol ǫ-computing Disjnk . We first convert π into a protocol π
′
which externally ǫ-computes Disjnk . The protocol π
′ is defined as follows. For every bit b sent by a player in
π, the same player sends in π′ two bits b.b. In addition, in π′, when player 1 stops and returns its output, it
sends to player 2 the message b.(1− b), where b is the output it computed.
Since in π player 1 ǫ-computes the function Disjnk , π
′ externally ǫ-computes Disjnk . Observe that
CC(π′) = 2 · CC(π) + 2.
By Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 6.4, there exists a constant β such that CC(π′) ≥ βkn−k2. Let α < β be a
constant. For n ≥ 1
α
k, we have k2 ≤ αkn and we get CC(π′) ≥ (β−α)kn = Ω(kn), and CC(π) = Ω(kn).
y
We note that our tight lower bound holds also for protocols where only one player is required to output
the value of the function.
7 Randomness complexity of private protocols
In this section we give a lower bound ofΩ(n) on the (information theoretic private computation) randomness
complexity of the function Disjnk , i.e., we prove that in order to privately compute Disj
n
k one needs Ω(n)
random bits. The significance of this result lies in that it is the first such lower bound that grows with the
size of the input, which is kn, while the output remains a single bit.
7.1 Private protocols and randomness
A protocol π is said to privately compute a given function if, at the end of the execution of the protocol, the
players have learned nothing but the value of that function. We note that the literature devoted to private
computation usually focuses on 0-error protocols, and therefore, in the rest of this section, we will restrict
ourselves to the case of 0-error protocols. The definitions for the case of ǫ-error privacy are similar, and
the propositions and their proofs presented in this section can be easily translated to the setting of ǫ-error
randomness complexity.
Furthermore, the literature on private computation is focused on synchronous protocols. In what follows
we therefore only consider protocols in that setting. In the synchronous setting, protocols advance according
to a global round structure. At every round, each player sends a message to every other player. In addition,
each player has an output tape. In order to ensure that no player is ever engaged in an infinite computation
process, it is required that on any input and randomness assignment, every player eventually stops sending
messages. That is, for a synchronous protocol π let ti(x, r) be the smallest integer such that if π is run on
(x, r) then player i does not send any message and does not write on its output tape after round ti(x, r). If
no such integer exists then ti(x, r) =∞. The requirement is that for every player i, input x, and randomness
assignment r ti(x, r) <∞.
The following lemma, which is a consequence of Ko¨nig’s lemma (cf. [32]), applies to any synchronous
protocol.
Lemma 7.1. Let π be a synchronous protocol. If for any i, x, and r, ti(x, r) < ∞, then there exists an
integer tf such that for any i, x, and r, ti(x, r) < tf .
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Based on the above lemma one can transform any synchronous protocol into a protocol that always runs
in a fixed number of rounds, and where all players output at the protocol’s end. This is done by simply
delaying the output until round tf . Observe that such transformation does not change the transcript of the
protocol or any other measure such as the number of random bits used.
We can now formally define privacy:
Definition 7.2. A k-player protocol π computing a function f is private10 if for every player i ∈ [[1, k]], for
all pairs of inputs x = (x1, . . . , xk) and x
′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
k), such that f(x) = f(x
′) and xi = x′i, for all
possible private random assignments ri of player i, and all possible public random assignments r
p, it holds
that for any transcript T
Pr[Πi = T | Ri = ri ; X = x ; R
p = rp] = Pr[Πi = T | Ri = ri ; X = x
′ ; Rp = rp]
where the probability is over the randomness R−i, and where Πi is the sequence of all messages sent to
player i.
It is well known that in the multi-party case, i.e., when we have k ≥ 3 players, any function can be
computed privately in the peer-to-peer model [5, 19]. Private protocols require the players to make use of
their private randomness. The minimal amount of private randomness needed to design a private protocol
for a given function is referred to as the randomness complexity of that function. While in the present paper
we make use of the notion of entropy, many papers on randomness in private protocols make use of the
notion of the number of random bits in order to measure “the amount of randomness used”. We repeat here
the definitions used in those papers.
Definition 7.3. A communication protocol is said to be d-random if, on any run, the total number of private
random bits used by all the players is at most d.
Definition 7.4. The randomness complexity R(f) of a function f is the minimal integer d such that there
exists a d-random private protocol computing f .
We will also use the following two (finer) notions which in fact make use of the notion of entropy.
Definition 7.5. The randomness complexity of a protocol π on input distribution η is defined as
Rη(π) = H(Π | XR
p) .
Definition 7.6. The randomness complexity of a function f on input distribution η is defined as
Rη(f) = inf
π private protocol computing f
Rη(π) .
Once the input and the public coins are fixed, the entropy of the transcript of a protocol comes solely from
the private randomness. Thus, for any input distribution η, Rη(π) provides a lower bound on the entropy
of the private randomness used by all the players in the protocol π. In order to relate our results (which are
stated in terms of entropy) to the notions previously used in the literature on the analysis of randomness in
private protocols, we use the fact that, up to constant factors, the number of (uniform) random bits necessary
for the generation of a random variable with a given entropy is equal to that entropy (cf. [33]). The following
lemma is then immediate.
10In this paper we consider only the setting of 1-privacy, which we call here for simplicity, privacy.
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Lemma 7.7. Let d be an integer. If there exists an input distribution η such thatRη(f) > d, thenR(f) > d.
This means that in order to give a lower bound on the randomness complexity of a function f , we can
find an input distribution η such that the randomness complexity of a function f on η is high. Since we are
interested here in characterizing the randomness used in private protocols, in the rest of this section, when
we use information terms such as SMIC, we will make the randomness appear explicitly in the conditioning.
To make private protocols formally fit into our model (Section 2.1), we further technically modify them
such that whenever a player does not send a message, it sends instead a special message indicating “empty
message”. Such protocols formally fit in our model and satisfy several additional properties. We call such
protocols proper synchronous protocols as defined below.
Definition 7.8. We say that a protocol as defined in Section 2.1 is proper synchronous if there is an integer
tf such that for every player i, every input x, and every random assignment r it holds that
• In every (local) round t < tf player i sends messages to all other players, and reads messages from
all other players.
• Player i stops at (local) round tf .
Observe that the above transformation from a synchronous protocol to a proper synchronous protocol
preserves privacy (if the original protocol was private), and the number of random bits used by the protocol
does not change. We therefore prove below our lower bound for (private) proper synchronous protocols.
7.2 Public information cost
The notion of public information cost was introduced in [31].
Definition 7.9. For any k-player protocol π and any input distribution η, we define the public information
cost of π:
PICη(π) =
k∑
i=1
I(X−i; ΠiR−i | XiRiRp) .
Note that this definition of PICη(π) slightly differs from the one given in [31], as the “transcript” Πi is
defined in the present paper in a different way compared to the way it is defined in [31]. However, since
we work in this section in the setting of proper synchronous protocols, the two definitions of a “transcript”
are completely equivalent in terms of information, and thus the definition of PICη(π) in the present paper is
equivalent to the one of [31].11
Definition 7.10. For any function f and any input distribution η, the zero-error public information cost of
f is
PICη(f) = inf
π
PICη(π)
where the infimum is taken over all protocols π which compute f with 0 error.
It was shown [31] that the public information cost can be used to prove randomness complexity lower
bounds via the following theorem.
11In fact, they would be equivalent even if we were not restricting ourselves to proper synchronous protocols. This is because of
the appearance of Xi, Ri in the conditioning.
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Theorem 7.11 ([31]). For any function of k variables f , for any input distribution η,
Rη(f) ≥
PICη(f)− k ·Hη(f(X))
k
.
We will need the following property of the public information cost.
Theorem 7.12 ([31]). For any function f and input distribution η,
PICη(f) = inf
π computing f , using only public coins
PICη(π) .
7.3 Randomness complexity of Disjointness
We will prove that the switched multi-party information cost gives a lower bound on the public information
cost. Let µ be the input distribution for the function ANDk defined in Section 5.
Theorem 7.13. For any public-coins proper synchronous k-player protocol π, where the players have n-bits
inputs X from (X,M,Z) ∼ µn, it holds that
PICµn(π) ≥
1
2
SMICµn(π) .
We start with a number of notations. Recall that we consider a proper synchronous protocol π. We
denote by (T
−→
lℓ
i )ℓ≥0 the sequence of messages sent by player i in the protocol π, ordered by local round of
player i, and within each round ordered by the index of the recipient player. Further denote by j(i, ℓ) the
player to which message T
−→
l
i is sent. Similarly, we denote by (T
←−
lℓ
i )ℓ≥0 the sequence of messages received
by player i, ordered in the same way. Observe that since π is proper synchronous there exists a function
ℓ′(i, ℓ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, ℓ ≥ 0, such that T
−→
lℓ
i and T
←−
lℓ′(i,ℓ)
j(i,ℓ) denote the same message. Further, for any ℓ0 ≥ 0,
let T<
−→
lℓ0
i be the random variable representing the so-far history, i.e., all the messages sent by player i and all
the messages received by player i until player i sends message T
−→
lℓ0
i (for the same local round we define the
order by the identity of the player sending or receiving the message). In a similar way, define T<
←−
lℓ0
i to be
the random variable representing the messages sent by player i and the messages received by player i until
it receives message T
←−
lℓ0
i . Further, we denote by
←−
Πi the partial transcript of player i composed only of the
incoming messages. I.e.,
←−
Πi is the (k − 1)-tuple (Πri,j)j 6=i.
Before giving the actual proof of Theorem 7.13 we define two information theoretic measures, which
we will use as intermediate quantities in that proof. These measures are defined only with respect to the
input distribution µn, and thus we do not indicate the distribution in the notation of these measures.
Definition 7.14.
ÎC(π) =
k∑
j=1
I(X−j ;
←−
Πj | XjR
pMZ) .
Definition 7.15.
I˜C(π) =
k∑
i=1
I(X−i; Πi | XiRpZ) .
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We now start the proof with two lemmas that relate the intermediate measures that we just defined to the
measure PIC.
Lemma 7.16. For any public-coins protocol π, ÎC(π) ≤ PICµn(π).
Proof. For any i ∈ [[1, k]],
I(X−i;
←−
Πi | XiR
pMZ) ≤ I(X−i; Πi | XiRpMZ)
≤ H(Πi | XiR
pMZ)
≤ H(Πi | XiR
p) (by Proposition A.2)
= H(Πi | XiR
p)−H(Πi | XiX−iRp) (because XiX−iRp determines Πi)
= I(X−i; Πi | XiRp) .
Summing over i ∈ [[1, k]] concludes the proof. y
Lemma 7.17. For any public-coins protocol π, I˜C(π) ≤ PICµn(π).
Proof. The proof is similar to the one of Lemma 7.16. For any i ∈ [[1, k]],
I(X−i; Πi | XiRpZ) ≤ H(Πi | XiRpZ)
≤ H(Πi | XiR
p) (by Proposition A.2)
= H(Πi | XiR
p)−H(Πi | XiX−iRp) (because XiX−iRp determines Πi)
= I(X−i; Πi | XiRp) .
Summing over i ∈ [[1, k]] concludes the proof. y
The next two lemmas together relate SMIC to the intermediate measures that we defined.
Lemma 7.18. For any public-coins protocol π,
k∑
i=1
I(M ; Πi | XiRpZ) ≤ I˜C(π).
Proof. We prove that ∀ i ∈ [[1, k]], I(M ; Πi | XiRpZ) ≤ I(X−i; Πi | XiRpZ).
I(M ; Πi | XiR
pZ) ≤ I(MX−i; Πi | XiRpZ)
≤ I(X−i; Πi | XiRpZ) + I(M ; Πi | XRpZ) (chain rule)
≤ I(X−i; Πi | XiRpZ) +H(Πi | XRpZ)
= I(X−i; Πi | XiRpZ) (because XRp determines Πi) .
Summing over i concludes the proof. y
The ideas behind the proof of the next lemma are similar to the ones developed in the proof of the
lower bound on the randomness complexity of the Parity function in [31]. However, the distribution and
the quantities involved being different, a different analysis is required here. We differ the proof of the next
lemma to the appendix.
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Lemma 7.19. For any public-coins proper synchronous protocol π,
k∑
i=1
I(Xi; Πi | RpMZ) ≤ ÎC(π).
We can now give the actual proof of Theorem 7.13.
Proof of Theorem 7.13. By Lemma 7.18 and Lemma 7.19 we have that
SMICµn(π) ≤ I˜C(π) + ÎC(π) ,
and using Lemma 7.17 and Lemma 7.16 we get
SMICµn(π) ≤ 2 · PICµn(π) .
y
We can now give a lower bound on the public information cost of the disjointness function.
Theorem 7.20. Let k > 3. For any proper synchronous protocol π computing Disjnk it holds that
PICµn(π) = Ω(kn) .
Proof. By Theorem 7.12, we only have to consider public-coins protocols. Observe that by adding an addi-
tional round to all players, such that, say, player 1 sends to player 2 his output, and all other k(k − 1)− 1
messages are constant, we can convert π into a protocol π′ externally computing Disjnk . By Theorem 6.2
and Theorem 7.13, it holds that PICµn(π
′) = Ω(kn). Since PICµn(π′) ≤ PICµn(π) + 1, we get that
PICµn(π) = Ω(kn).
y
Our lower bound on the randomness complexity of the disjointness function then follows.
Theorem 7.21. Let k > 3. R(Disjnk) = Ω(n).
Proof. By Theorem 7.20, PICµn(Disj
n
k) = Ω(kn). Moreover, Hµn(Disj
n
k) = 0. Applying Theorem 7.11
(and Lemma 7.7), we get
R(Disjnk) ≥ Rµn(Disj
n
k) ≥
Ω(kn)
k
= Ω(n) .
y
8 Conclusions and open problems
We introduce new models and new information theoretic tools for the study of communication complexity,
and other complexity measures, in the natural peer-to-peer, multi-party, number-in-hand setting. We prove
a number of properties of our new models and measures, and exemplify their effectiveness by proving
two lower bounds on communication complexity, as well as a lower bound on the amount of randomness
necessary for certain private computations.
To the best of our knowledge, our lower bounds on communication complexity are the first tight (non-
trivial) lower bounds on communication complexity in the natural peer-to-peer multi-party setting, and our
lower bound on the randomness complexity of private computations is the first that grows with the size of
the input, while the computed function is a boolean one (i.e., the size of the output does not grow with the
size of the input).
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We believe that our models and tools may find additional applications and may open the way to further
study of the natural peer-to-peer setting and to the building of a more solid bridge between the the fields of
communication complexity and of distributed computation.
Our work raises a number of questions. First, how can one relax the restrictions that we impose on
the general asynchronous model and still prove communication complexity lower bounds in a peer-to-peer
setting? Our work seems to suggest that novel techniques and ideas, possibly not based on information
theory, are necessary for this task, and it would be most interesting to find those. Second, it would be
interesting to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee the “rectangularity” property
of communication protocols in a peer-to-peer setting. While this property is fundamental to the analysis of
two-party protocols, it turns out that once one turns to the multi-party peer-to-peer setting, not only does
this property become subtle to prove, but also this property does not always hold. Given the central (and
sometimes implicit) role of the rectangularity property in the literature, it would be interesting to identify
when it holds in the multi-party peer-to-peer number-in-hand setting.
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A Background in Information Theory
We give a reminder on basic information theory tools that are of use in the present paper. A good reference
is the book of Cover and Thomas [20]. We always consider a probability space over a discrete domain.
A.1 Entropy and mutual information
Definition A.1. The entropy12 of a random variable X is
H(X) =
∑
x
Pr[X = x] log
(
1
Pr[X = x]
)
.
We further use the notation
H(X | Y = y) =
∑
x
Pr[X = x | Y = y] log
(
1
Pr[X = x | Y = y]
)
.
The conditional entropy H(X | Y ) is defined as E
y
[H(X | Y = y)].
Proposition A.2. For any random variables X and Y ,H(X | Y ) ≤ H(X).
The entropy of a random variable is always non-negative.
Theorem A.3 (Shannon). For all prefix-free finite set X ⊆ {0, 1}∗ and all random variable X with support
supp(X) ⊆ X , it holds
H(X) ≤ E[|X|] .
Definition A.4. The mutual information between two random variables X,Y is
I(X;Y ) = H(X) −H(X | Y ) .
The mutual information of X and Y conditioned on Z is
I(X;Y | Z) = H(X | Z)−H(X | Y Z) .
The mutual information measures the change in the entropy of X when one learns the value of Y . It is
symmetric, and non-negative.
Proposition A.5. For any random variables X, Y and Z , I(X;Y | Z) = 0 if and only if X and Y are
independent conditioned on every possible value of Z .
12In this paper we refer to the binary entropy by simply saying “entropy”.
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We will use extensively the following proposition, known under the name of chain rule.
Proposition A.6. For any random variables A, B, C ,D,
I(AB;C | D) = I(A;C | D) + I(B;C | DA) .
The data processing inequality expresses the fact that information can only be lost when applying a
function to a random variable.
Proposition A.7. For any random variables X, Y , Z , and any function f
I(X; f(Y ) | Z) ≤ I(X;Y | Z) .
We will occasionally make use of the two following lemmas, which allow to add or remove a random
variable from the conditioning.
Lemma A.8 ([7]). For any random variables A, B, C ,D such that I(B;D | AC) = 0,
I(A;B | C) ≥ I(A;B | CD) .
Lemma A.9 ([7]). For any random variables A, B, C ,D such that I(B;D | C) = 0,
I(A;B | C) ≤ I(A;B | CD) .
We further give a lemma which is an certain extension of the data processing inequality, allowing the
processing to depend also on part of the conditioning.
Lemma A.10. Let A, B, C ,D, φ = ϕ(C,B) be random variables. Then,
I(A;φ | CD) ≤ I(A;B | CD) .
Proof.
I(A;φ | CD) = I(A;ϕ(C,B) | CD)
= E
c
[I(A;ϕ(c,B) | C = c,D)]
≤ E
c
[I(A;B | C = c,D)] (by the data processing inequality, Proposition A.7)
≤ I(A;B | CD).
y
A.2 Hellinger distance
We will make an extensive use of the Hellinger distance.
Definition A.11. Let P and Q be two distributions over a domain Ω. The Hellinger distance between P
and Q is h(P,Q) = 1√
2
√∑
ω∈Ω
|
√
P (ω)−
√
Q(ω) |2.
It can be easily checked that the Hellinger distance is indeed a “distance”. When using the square of the
Hellinger distance, we often use the following identity.
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Proposition A.12. Let P and Q be two distributions over a domain Ω.
h2(P,Q) = 1−
∑
ω∈Ω
√
P (ω)Q(ω) .
Hellinger distance can be related to mutual information by the following relation.
LemmaA.13 ([3]). Let η0, η1 be two distributions over the same domain, and suppose that Y is generated as
follows: first select S uniformly in {0, 1}, and then sample Y according to ηS . Then I(S;Y ) ≥ [h(η0, η1)]2.
Another useful measure is the statistical distance.
Definition A.14. Let P and Q be two distributions over a domain Ω. The statistical distance between P
and Q is
∆(P,Q) = max
Ω′⊆Ω
| P (Ω′)−Q(Ω′) | .
Hellinger distance and statistical distance are related by the following relation.
Lemma A.15. Let P and Q be two distributions over the same domain. h(P,Q) ≥ 1√
2
∆(P,Q).
B A technical lemma
Claim B.1. Let π be a protocol, let i be a given player, and let 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 12 be fixed. If, when running
π, player i ǫ-computes a boolean function f , then H(f(X) | XiRiRpΠi) ≤ h(ǫ), where h is the binary
entropy function.
Proof. Let θ be the (deterministic) function that takes as parameter (xi, ri, r
p, πi) and returns the output of
player i. Define the random variable P = θ(Xi, R
p, Ri,Πi), and the random variable M = 1 − δf(X),P ,
i.e., the indicator variable of the event f(X) 6= P . Observe that
Pr(M = 1) = E[M ]
=
∑
x
Pr(X = x)E[M | X = x]
=
∑
x
Pr(X = x) Pr(M = 1 | X = x)
≤
∑
x
Pr(X = x) · ǫ (since player i ǫ-computes f )
≤ ǫ .
Thus we have
H(f(X) | XiRiR
pΠi) ≤ H(f(X) | P ) (data processing inequality)
= H(M | P ) (since, given P , there is a bijection between f(X) andM )
≤ H(M)
= h(Pr(M = 1)) (since M is binary)
≤ h(ǫ) (since h is increasing in [0, 1/2]).
y
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C Some of the proofs
This section contains the proofs that were deferred to the appendix.
Proof of Lemma 3.7. We prove the claim for an arbitrary player i ∈ [[1, k]]. To prove the statement of the
lemma define, for x′i ∈ Xi,
qi(x
′
i, τ) = Pr[(x
′
i, Ri) ∈ Ii(τ)] ,
and for x′−i ∈ X−i,
q−i(x′−i, τ) = Pr[(x
′
−i, R−i) ∈ Ji(τ )] .
We have, for x ∈ X ,
Pr[Πi(x) = τ ] = Pr[(x,R) ∈ Ai(τ )]
= Pr[(xi, Ri) ∈ Ii(τ) & (x−i, R−i) ∈ Ji(τ)] by Lemma 3.6
= Pr[(xi, Ri) ∈ Ii(τ)]× Pr[(x−i, R−i) ∈ Ji(τ)]
= qi(xi, τ )q−i(x−i, τ ) .
We now prove the second claim. Define, for x′−i,∈ X−i,
p−i(x′−i, τ) = Pr[(x
′
−i, R−i) ∈ Hi(τ)] .
We have
Pr[Π(x) = τ ] = Pr[(x,R) ∈ B(τ))]
= Pr[(xi, Ri) ∈ Ii(τi) & (x−i, R−i) ∈ Hi(τ))] by Lemma 3.6
= Pr[(xi, Ri) ∈ Ii(τi)]× Pr[(x−i, R−i) ∈ Hi(τ))]
= qi(xi, τi)p−i(x−i, τ) .
y
Proof of Lemma 3.8. By Lemma A.15, we only need to show that ∆(Π(x),Π(y)) ≥ 1− 2ǫ. By
definition, there exists a function θ taking as input the possible transcripts of π and verifying
∀ x ∈ X ,Pr[θ(Π(x)) = f(x)] ≥ 1− ǫ.
Let Ω′ = θ−1(f(x)). We have Pr[Π(x) ∈ Ω′] = Pr[θ(Π(x)) = f(x)] ≥ 1− ǫ and
Pr[Π(y) ∈ Ω′] = Pr[Π(y) ∈ θ−1(f(x))]
≤ Pr[Π(y) 6∈ θ−1(f(y))] since θ−1(f(x)) ∩ θ−1(f(y)) = ∅
≤ 1− Pr[Π(y) ∈ θ−1(f(y))]
≤ 1− (1− ǫ) = ǫ.
Thus
∆(Π(x),Π(y)) ≥ Pr[Π(x) ∈ Ω′]− Pr[Π(y) ∈ Ω′]
≥ (1− ǫ)− ǫ = 1− 2ǫ.
y
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Proof of Lemma 3.9. Let T be the set of all possible transcripts of π. In what follows we simplify notation
and write
∑
τ
instead of
∑
τ∈T
. Using Proposition A.12,
1− h2(Π(x),Π(y)) =
∑
τ
√
Pr[Π(x) = τ ] Pr[Π(y) = τ ]
=
∑
τ
√
qi(xi, τi)p−i(x−i, τ)qi(yi, τi)p−i(y−i, τ) By Lemma 3.7
=
∑
τ
√
qi(xi, τi)qi(yi, τi)
√
p−i(x−i, τ)p−i(y−i, τ)
≤
∑
τ
qi(xi, τi) + qi(yi, τi)
2
√
p−i(x−i, τ)p−i(y−i, τ)
≤
1
2
(∑
τ
√
qi(xi, τi)p−i(x−i, τ)qi(xi, τi)p−i(y−i, τ)
+
∑
τ
√
qi(yi, τi)p−i(x−i, τ)qi(yi, τi)p−i(y−i, τ)
)
≤
1
2
(∑
τ
√
Pr[Π(x) = τ ] Pr[Π(y[i←xi]) = τ ]
+
∑
τ
√
Pr[Π(x[i←yi]) = τ ] Pr[Π(y) = τ ]
)
≤
1
2
[
1− h2(Π(x),Π(y[i←xi])) + 1− h
2(Π(x[i←yi]),Π(y))
]
≤ 1−
1
2
[
h2(Π(x),Π(y[i←xi])) + h
2(Π(x[i←yi]),Π(y))
]
.
y
Proof of Lemma 5.1. We write Pr[Πi = τi | Xi = x′,M = m,Z = z] as∑
x∈{0,1}k
(Pr[X = x | Xi = x
′,M = m,Z = z]× Pr[Πi = τi | X = x,Xi = x′,M = m,Z = z]) .
Note that
Pr[X = x | Xi = x
′,M = m,Z = z] = δxi,x′ Pr[X−i = x−i |M = m,Z = z] ,
since, conditioned on M = m,Z = z, Xi and X−i are independent. Further note that for x such that
xi = x
′,
Pr[Πi = τi | X = x,Xi = x
′,M = m,Z = z] = Pr[Πi(x) = τi] .
By Lemma 3.7, there exist functions qi and q−i such that
∀ x ∈ {0, 1}k , Pr[Πi(x) = τi] = qi(xi, τi)q−i(x−i, τi) .
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Therefore we can write
Pr[Πi = τi | Xi = x,M = m,Z = z] =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
(δxi,x′qi(xi, τi)q−i(x−i, τi)×
Pr[X−i = x−i |M = m,Z = z])
= qi(x
′, τi)
∑
xˆ∈{0,1}k−1
(q−i(xˆ, τi)×
Pr[X−i = xˆ |M = m,Z = z])
= qi(x
′, τi)ci(m, z, τi)
where ci(m, z, τi) =
∑
xˆ∈{0,1}k−1
q−i(xˆ, τi) Pr[X−i = xˆ |M = m,Z = z].
The proof of the second statement is similar:
Pr[Π = τ | Xi = x,M = m,Z = z] =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
(Pr[X = x | Xi = x
′,M = m,Z = z]×
Pr[Π = τ | X = x,Xi = x
′,M = m,Z = z]).
Note that
Pr[X = x | Xi = x
′,M = m,Z = z] = δxi,x′ Pr[X−i = x−i |M = m,Z = z] ,
since, conditioned on M = m,Z = z,, Xi and X−i are independent. Further note that for x such that
xi = x
′,
Pr[Π = τ | X = x,Xi = x
′,M = m,Z = z] = Pr[Π(x) = τ ] .
By Lemma 3.7, there exist functions qi and p−i such that
∀ x ∈ {0, 1}k , Pr[Π(x) = τ ] = qi(xi, τi)p−i(x−i, τ) .
Therefore we can write
Pr[Π = τ | Xi = x
′,M = m,Z = z] =
∑
x∈{0,1}k
(
δxi,x′qi(xi, τi)p−i(x−i, τ)×
Pr[X−i = x−i |M = m,Z = z])
= qi(x
′, τi)
∑
xˆ∈{0,1}k−1
(p−i(xˆ, τ)×
Pr[X−i = xˆ |M = m,Z = z])
= qi(x
′, τi)c(m, z, τ)
where c(m, z, τ) =
∑
xˆ∈{0,1}k−1
p−i(xˆ, τ) Pr[X−i = xˆ |M = m,Z = z].
y
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Proof of Lemma 5.2. Using Lemma 5.1, we write
Pr[Πi[0, 0, j] = τ ] = qi(0, τ )ci(0, j, τ ) and Pr[Πi[1, 1, j] = τ ] = qi(1, τ )ci(1, j, τ ).
Using Lemma 3.7, we write
Pr[Πi(e
k
i,j) = τ ] = qi(0, τ )q−i(e
k−1
j , τ) and Pr[Πi(e
k
j ) = τ ] = qi(1, τ )q−i(e
k−1
j , τ).
Note that Πi[1, 1, j] = Πi(e
k
j ), and thus
qi(1, τ ) 6= 0⇒ ci(1, j, τ ) = q−i(ek−1j , τ) .
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By Proposition A.12,
1− h2(Πi[0, 0, j],Πi [1, 1, j]) =
∑
τ
√
Pr[Πi[0, 0, j] = τ ] Pr[Πi[1, 1, j] = τ ]
=
∑
τ
√
qi(0, τ )ci(0, j, τ )qi(1, τ )ci(1, j, τ )
≤
∑
τ
√
qi(0, τ )qi(1, τ )
(
ci(0, j, τ ) + ci(1, j, τ )
2
)
≤
1
2
(∑
τ
√
qi(0, τ )ci(0, j, τ )qi(1, τ )ci(0, j, τ ) +
∑
τ
√
qi(0, τ )ci(1, j, τ )qi(1, τ )ci(1, j, τ )
)
≤
1
2
(∑
τ
√
qi(0, τ )ci(0, j, τ )qi(1, τ )ci(0, j, τ ) +
∑
τ |qi(1,τ )6=0
√
qi(0, τ )ci(1, j, τ )qi(1, τ )ci(1, j, τ )

≤
1
2
(∑
τ
√
qi(0, τ )ci(0, j, τ )qi(1, τ )ci(0, j, τ ) +
∑
τ |qi(1,τ )6=0
√
qi(0, τ )q−i(ek−1j , τ)qi(1, τ )q−i(e
k−1
j , τ )

≤
1
2
(∑
τ
√
qi(0, τ )ci(0, j, τ )qi(1, τ )ci(0, j, τ ) +
∑
τ
√
qi(0, τ )q−i(ek−1j , τ)qi(1, τ )q−i(e
k−1
j , τ )
)
≤
1
2
(∑
τ
√
Pr[Πi[0, 0, j] = τ ] Pr[Πi[1, 0, j] = τ ] +
∑
τ
√
Pr[Πi(eki,j) = τ ] Pr[Πi(e
k
j ) = τ ]
)
≤
1
2
(1− h2(Πi[0, 0, j],Πi [1, 0, j]) + 1− h
2(Πi(e
k
i,j),Πi(e
k
j )))
≤ 1− h2(Πi(e
k
i,j), (Πi(e
k
j )).
y
Proof of Lemma 5.3. Using Lemma 3.7, we write
Pr[Πi(e
k
i,j) = τ ] = qi(0, τ )q−i(e
k−1
j , τ)
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and
Pr[Π(eki,j) = τ ] = qi(0, τi)p−i(e
k−1
j , τ) .
As Pr[Πi(e
k
i,j) = τ ] =
∑
τ |τi=τ
Pr[Π(eki,j) = τ ] we have
qi(0, τ )q−i(ek−1j , τ ) =
∑
τ |τi=τ
qi(0, τi)p−i(ek−1j , τ) = qi(0, τ )
∑
τ |τi=τ
p−i(ek−1j , τ) ,
and thus
qi(0, τ ) 6= 0⇒ q−i(ek−1j , τ ) =
∑
τ |τi=τ
p−i(ek−1j , τ) .
Using Proposition A.12, we can write
1− h2(Πi(e
k
i,j),Πi(e
k
j )) =
∑
τ
√
Pr[Πi(eki,j) = τ ] Pr[Πi(e
k
j ) = τ ]
=
∑
τ
√
qi(0, τ )q−i(ek−1j , τ)qi(1, τ )q−i(e
k−1
j , τ)
=
∑
τ
√
qi(0, τ )qi(1, τ )q−i(ek−1j , τ)
=
∑
τ |qi(0,τ )6=0
√
qi(0, τ )qi(1, τ )q−i(ek−1j , τ )
=
∑
τ |qi(0,τ )6=0
√qi(0, τ )qi(1, τ ) ∑
τ |τi=τ
p−i(ek−1j , τ)

=
∑
τ
√qi(0, τ )qi(1, τ ) ∑
τ |τi=τ
p−i(ek−1j , τ)

=
∑
τ
(√
qi(0, τi)qi(1, τi)p−i(ek−1j , τ)
)
=
∑
τ
√
Pr[Π(eki,j) = τ ] Pr[Π(e
k
j ) = τ ]
= 1− h2(Π(eki,j),Π(e
k
j )) .
y
Proof of Lemma 7.19. For the purpose of the proof we define a certain order on the messages in Πi, i.e., on
all messages sent and received by player i as follows. We order the messages of Πi by (local) rounds of
player i, and inside each round have first the messages sent by player i, ordered by the index of the recipient,
and have then the messages received by player i, ordered by the index of the sender. For a given player i,
we denote the sequence thus defined as (Bd)d≥0.
Now, by the chain rule, applied on the messages of Πi by the order we just defined, and after rearranging
the summands, we have
I(Xi; Πi | R
pMZ) =
∑
ℓ
I(Xi;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) +
∑
ℓ
I(Xi;T
←−
lℓ
i | T
<
←−
lℓ
i R
pMZ) .
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We now show that every summand of the second sum equals 0.
To this end, we now show by induction on the index d that ∀d, I(Xi;X−i | MZRpB0 . . . Bd) = 0. We
have I(Xi;X−i |MZRp) = 0, because according to µn, conditioned onMZ ,Xi andX−i are independent.
Assume now the induction hypothesis that for some d, I(Xi;X−i |MZRpB0 . . . Bd) = 0. If the message
Bd+1 is sent by player i, then Bd+1 is a function of Xi, R
p and B0 . . . Bd and thus
I(Xi;X−i |MZRpB0 . . . Bd+1) = H(X−i |MZRpB0 . . . Bd+1) −
H(X−i |MZRpB0 . . . Bd+1Xi)
≤ H(X−i |MZRpB0 . . . Bd) −
H(X−i |MZRpB0 . . . BdXi)
= I(Xi;X−i |MZRpB0 . . . Bd)
= 0 .
Similarly, if the message Bd+1 is received by player i, then Bd+1 is a function of X−i, Rp and B0 . . . Bd
and thus
I(Xi;X−i |MZRpB0 . . . Bd+1) = H(Xi |MZRpB0 . . . Bd+1) −
H(Xi |MZR
pB0 . . . Bd+1X−i)
≤ H(Xi |MZR
pB0 . . . Bd) −
H(Xi |MZR
pB0 . . . BdX−i)
= I(Xi;X−i |MZRpB0 . . . Bd)
= 0 .
Thus we have that
∀d, I(Xi;X−i |MZRpB0 . . . Bd) = 0 . (3)
From Eq. (3), by choosing the relevant d for any given ℓ, we can also write for all ℓ
I(Xi;X−i | T<
←−
lℓ
i R
pMZ) = 0. Applying Lemma A.10 with A = Xi, B = X−i, C = (T<
←−
lℓ
i , R
p),
D = (M,Z) and φ = T
←−
lℓ
i = ϕ(T
<
←−
lℓ
i , R
p,X−i) yields I(Xi;T
←−
lℓ
i | T
<
←−
lℓ
i R
pMZ) = 0. We have thus shown
that
I(Xi; Πi | R
pMZ) =
∑
ℓ
I(Xi;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) ,
and thus
k∑
i=1
I(Xi; Πi | R
pMZ) =
∑
i
∑
ℓ
I(Xi;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) . (4)
We note that the equation I(Xi; Πi | RpMZ) =
∑
ℓ
I(Xi;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) that we proved above
formalizes the intuitive assertion that if we consider the messages of Πi in their order of appearance, then
additional information on Xi is obtained only from messages sent by player i, but not from messages re-
ceived by player i.
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We now relate ÎC to the right-hand-side of Eq. (4). Starting from the definition of ÎC and using the chain
rule, we decompose ÎC into a sum over all messages received in the protocol:
ÎC(π) =
k∑
j=1
∑
ℓ′≥0
I(X−j ;T
←−
lℓ′
j | T
←−
l0
j . . . T
←−
lℓ′−1
j XjR
pMZ)
=
k∑
j=1
∑
ℓ′≥0
I(X−j ;T
←−
lℓ′
j | T
<
←−
lℓ′
j XjR
pMZ) ,
where the second equality follows from the fact that the messages in T<
←−
lℓ′
j which are sent by player j are a
function of Xj , R
p and of the messages in T<
←−
lℓ′
j which are received by player j.
We now rearrange this sum by considering the messages from the point of view of the sender rather than
the receiver. In what follows we use j as a shorthand of j(i, ℓ) and ℓ′ as a shorthand of ℓ′(i, ℓ).13 We have
ÎC(π) =
k∑
i=1
∑
ℓ≥0
I(X−j ;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
←−
lℓ′
j XjR
pMZ) .
To conclude the proof our objective now is to show that for any message T
−→
lℓ
i ,
I(Xi;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) ≤ I(X−j ;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
←−
lℓ′
j XjR
pMZ) . (5)
Observe that since T
−→
lℓ
i is determined by XiR
pT<
−→
lℓ
i , we have H(T
−→
lℓ
i | XiT
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) = 0, and thus
I(Xi;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) = H(T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ). Similarly, we have that
I(X−j ;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
←−
lℓ′
j XjR
pMZ) = H(T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
←−
lℓ′
j XjR
pMZ). Thus,
I(Xi;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) ≤ I(X−j ;T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
←−
lℓ′
j XjR
pMZ)
m
H(T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) ≤ H(T
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
←−
lℓ′
j XjR
pMZ)
m
I(T
−→
lℓ
i ;T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) ≥ I(T
−→
lℓ
i ;T
<
←−
lℓ′
j XjR
pMZ) .
The last inequality clearly holds if I(T
−→
l
i ;T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) = I(T
−→
lℓ
i ;T
<
−→
lℓ
i T
<
←−
lℓ′
j XjR
pMZ), which itself holds
if
I(T
−→
lℓ
i ;T
<
←−
lℓ′
j Xj | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) = 0 . (6)
Notice that given the value of T<
−→
l
i R
pMZ , T
−→
lℓ
i is determined by Xi, and thus by the data processing
inequality (Proposition A.7) we have
I(Xi;T
<
←−
lℓ′
j Xj | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) ≥ I(T
−→
lℓ
i ;T
<
←−
lℓ′
j Xj | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) ,
13Recall that j(i, ℓ) and ℓ′(i, ℓ) are defined such that message T
−→
lℓ
i is identified with the message T
←−
lℓ′(i,ℓ)
j(i,ℓ) .
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and Eq. 6 holds if I(Xi;T
<
←−
lℓ′
j Xj | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) = 0.
Let t be the (global) round in which player j receives T
←−
lℓ′
j , which is also the (global) round in which
player i sends T
−→
lℓ
i (recall that in fact T
←−
lℓ′
j is the same message as T
−→
lℓ
i ). Now, all the messages in T
<
←−
lℓ′
j are
received or sent by player j no later than (global) round t, and all the messages sent by player i which are
not in T<
−→
lℓ
i are sent by player i no earlier than (global) round t. Hence, T
<
←−
lℓ′
j is a function of (X−i, T
<
−→
lℓ
i ).
We also have trivially that Xj is a function of X−i. Thus, the data processing inequality implies that
I(Xi;T
<
←−
lℓ′
j Xj | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) ≤ I(Xi;X−iT<
−→
lℓ
i | T
<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) = I(Xi;X−i | T<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) .
By Eq. (3), I(Xi;X−i | T<
−→
lℓ
i R
pMZ) = 0, which concludes the proof of Eq. (6) and therefore of Eq. (5) and
of the lemma. y
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